



REPORT ON SESSION THIRTEEN OF HIGH-LEVEL BREAKFAST DISCUSSION AND STRATEGIC THINKING ON THE PEACE PROCESS IN SOUTH SUDAN

CIVIL SOCIETY AND NON-PARTISAN STAKEHOLDERS OF
SOUTH SUDAN: SHIFT FROM WAR TO PEACE ADVOCACY
THROUGH R-ARCSS IMPLEMENTATION

I - THE FUNCTION AND ATTENDANCE

The South Sudan Center for Strategic and Policy Studies (CSPS) organized the thirteenth **HIGH-LEVEL BREAKFAST DISCUSSION AND STRATEGIC THINKING ON PEACE PROCESS IN SOUTH SUDAN** at Pyramid Continental Hotel in Juba on Thursday, 10th 2019. The event brought together 30 renowned civil society leaders, religious leaders, political analysts, academic professionals, practicing lawyers, NGOs leaders, private sector actors, government officials and diplomats who are engaged directly or indirectly to the **2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)**. The participants arrived at the unique conducive venue at prime morning time and took breakfast in the main Restaurant (07:35h – 08:35h a.m) before converging in the Conference Room for the discussion with recommendation for way forward (08:45h to 11:00 am).

II – OBJECTIVES AND DISCUSSION

Session thirteen of High-level Breakfast Discussion was organized to refocus the endeavours of the Civil Society and Non-Partisan Stakeholders of South Sudan with shift from war to peace advocacy through R-ARCSS implementation. These were the expected outputs:

- (i). Acknowledging the positive role that has been played by civil society and non-partisan stakeholders of South Sudan in peace undertakings.
- (ii). Recommending effective advocacy tools for the civil society and non-partisan stakeholders to persuade parties to the R-ARCSS to solemnly commit themselves to peace and stability.
- (iii). Strengthening pressure capacity of civil society and non-partisans stakeholders by coalescing their true voices with genuine reflection of aspirations of the people of South Sudan inside the country and abroad.
- (iv). Providing alternative evidence-based lobbying and advocacy solutions as recommended by the civil society and non-partisans stakeholders in the interest of reforms and good governance in South Sudan.
- (v). Designing and coordinating networking strategic plans of the civil society and non-partisans stakeholders of South Sudan and linking these to their counterparts in the neighbouring countries, in the region and at international level.

Mr. Monyluak Alor Kuol moderated the High-level Breakfast Discussion. He is a renowned South Sudanese lawyer. He holds M.Phil in Social Anthropology from University of Oxford in UK, LL.M in International Human Rights Law from Essex University in UK, LL.B from University of Khartoum and Sudan Bar Certificate since 1982. He worked in a number of UN Missions and Agencies and is currently a practicing Advocate and Commissioner for Oaths at Liberty Advocates Law Firm in Juba, South Sudan.

Mr. Wachira Maina was the invited expert who gave the leading professional talk at the High-level Breakfast Discussion. He holds LLB, LLM, and Diploma in Law. He is a renowned constitutional lawyer and an independent lawyer in Kenya. He served as Advisor and Coach on law reforms, anti-corruption and other governance issues of nation-building in the Office of the President of Rwanda. He worked as Governance Advisor in USAID Mission in Kenya. He has served as CEO in many Kenyan organizations and was awarded accolades as recognition of his good work in a number of boards. In 1996 he was named by Time Magazine in the list of “Global 100’ future leaders.

Guided by the above-mentioned objectives, the lead expert and moderator steered the exclusive High-level Breakfast Discussion cordially with frank conversation under Chatham House Rule. **Mr. Wachira Maina** expressed his gratitude for being invited by the CSPS to come to South Sudan and give a frank talk on civil society and non-partisan stakeholders based on his comparative experience in Africa and abroad. He identified the basic factors that determine the effectiveness of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), especially in post-conflict societies. One of these factors is the environment of conflict with its long-term effects on the nature of the war-mongering regime. The other factor is the macro-economic and macro-political realities that shape civic space as indicated by fiscal basis of the state and lack of a public idea of ‘loyal opposition’ in deeply divided post-conflict societies.

According to him the overall impact of conflict is seen in the erosion of good governance norms and social capital, which undermine the strength and resilience of public institutions. The state then evolves with deficit of trust in its institutions, both by the people and by the state itself on its citizens. In such situation, government often lacks the capacity and legitimacy to regulate CSOs but defaulting its weakness by resorting to strong measures even when these are unjustified. The weakness stems from the nature of the regime. For example, governments that come to power through liberation or rebel movements credits have strong view on their own legitimacy and often do not know when that legitimacy evaporates. This is what has happened with Presidents Museveni, Kagame, Zenawi, Mugabe and Aferworki. These ‘liberators’ and former rebellion leaders often forget that the legitimacy of their success came from social support. They tend to question the legitimacy of everyone else who has not earned their credentials the hard way from war field (recalling the remarkable consistency in the language of late Meles Zenawi, Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame).

Mr. Wachira contended that CSOs civic space get squeezed further by fiscal basis of the state and lack of conception of ‘loyal opposition’, especially in deeply divided post-conflict societies. Whether a state depends on revenues from taxes or rents/windfalls from natural resources is strongly correlated with existence of weak or strong civil society. When state revenues are independent from taxation, government becomes free from taxpayers pressure and demands for accountability by to key social and economic groups. This is what has happened in Angola where few alternative sources of livelihoods and resources led to lack of independent means of funding civic action and associations (e.g., of manufacturers and unions who tend to be weak to hold the government accountable).

Also the natural resource economy in conflict or post-conflict as well as in non-conflict situations are strongly correlated to unemployment, bloated state, weak private sector and weak civil society. In many natural resource economies, rural and urban differences tend to be problematic. This divided and enclave economies often become very sharp in rural areas that have been subjected to economic backwardness, making it difficult for CSOs to mobilise them as ‘voting reservoirs’ against the contending urban elites who have access to resource revenues and purchasing power to buy political consent (e.g., high levels of

defections from opposition parties in Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea). Also the Government gets the monopoly of control of key revenue streams that are external to the country, making this the most precious prize of war. The state's monopoly and control of resource has consequences on CSOs, particularly when the government is in a position to buy critics and consolidate rent-seeking culture. Such kind of 'Trojan horse politics' is common in Gabon and Angola where committed leadership and institutional building are not prioritized as prime civic virtues.

Mr. Wachira underscored that the absence of public conception of 'loyal opposition' and 'political neutrality' has left the CSOs vulnerable as they tip toe around the proposed regulatory laws but with uncertainty about what will be approved for the common good. That problem is made worse by the fact that in most post-conflict countries there is little private media to offer alternative perspectives. The state-controlled media are often restricted for CSOs that are vocal on issues of governance and human rights. Government sees CSOs as opposition and in the worst of cases, constantly stigmatizing and challenging the legitimacy of CSOs. This makes the public to be suspicious and fearful of associating with certain CSO leaders. It makes it harder for the CSOs to build strong networks they need in order to have legitimacy, including inability to influence armed groups to develop a culture of peace in post-conflict. The CSOs face hard time to build their own capacities in context of divided societies, competing agenda and scarce resources. This is what has been happening in Colombia and Cameroon as far as the work of CSOs is concerned.



The fact that there are opposition-allied CSOs and Government-allied CSOs disqualifies the assumption that CSOs are less divided politically, ideologically and ethnically than political parties. The polarization often mirror political and ethnic divisions because CSOs, like parties, suffer ideological differences and can become too externally-oriented when they spent too much time on second-guessing what donors are likely to fund regardless of responding the pressing needs of the people. This makes the concept of 'donor capture' applicable to situation where CSOs are captured or have themselves captured by donors.

The effects of polarization and fragmentation makes it harder for CSOs to speak with one voice. This subjects them to easier manipulation by government or opposition as well as by donors and spoilers or even by mediators (i.e., when mediators lose legitimacy with the warring factions they often enlist CSOs to help them). However, the expectation by donors that somehow unarmed civil society can influence armed political groups is too optimistic as this depends on the stage of the conflict and stakes involved. Armed groups often have no time for peace ambassadors, particularly if they think that they will be asked to negotiate away something that they value (British Prime Minister Winston Churchill cautioned Joseph Stalin to consider the views of Vatican, asking “how many divisions does the Pope have?”).

According to Mr. Wachira, governments have their own techniques of limiting the civic space in post-conflict societies. A long period of conflict leaves a climate of hostility to basic freedoms, which are seen as Trojan horses for the opposition. Given this suspicions, government in post-conflict situations often adopt restrictive and punitive laws that directly or indirectly impact on CSOs. Examples of these are NGOs, Philanthropy, Aide and Banking laws. Also the CSOs become subject to pervasive security threats, especially where DDR programmes are conducted partially, incompletely and with too many arms in private hands. Such threats include personal risks for CSOs workers and families. Examples of these are the threats and intimidation hurled against members of the public who work with CSOs or are offering services to CSOs (e.g., landlords and suppliers); attacks and burglaries against the vocal CSOs and their facilities, especially during elections time (e.g., in 2017 Ugandan police and security service raided the offices of Action Aid Uganda and the Great Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies, similar to what Cameroon security forces did since the separatist movement begun); and restrictions on communication and blockage of access to media (e.g internet shutdowns and overloading the phones networks have become so common in countries that fear civil uprisings Ethiopia, the DRC, Mali, Morocco, Senegal, Somaliland, Togo and Cameroon, which denied general communication access to groups based in Amazonia).

Despite the difficulties, Mr. Wachira believes that there are still many ways in which CSOs can add value to R-ARCSS through the establishment of Revitalized Government of National Unity with specific mandate of delivering on the dividends of peace. The CSOs have the duty to track and monitor on the ground periodically the R-ARCSS implementation status, including identification of barriers, constraints, spoilers, promoters and opportunities. They can provide evidence-based recommendations for solutions from the collected data or information about peace process, including dealing with unintended consequences. However, it has to be well-noted that border demarcations often introduce new conflicts after resolving old ones and where quality services are not offered honestly and equally to the citizens. Also the rebels who appeared to be responding to the call for disarmament often give up old weapons and hide effective ones. He suggested the following possible actions for the CSOs of South Sudan if they have to shift their efforts from war to peace situation advocacy:

- (i). Develop monitoring indicators and milestones for R-ARCSS implementation, tracking the progression or the retrogression on the spirit and the letter of peace agreement (this is what Kenyan CSOs did through Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation).

- (ii). Advocate and lobby for the voice of groups that have been excluded or the communities who are silent and ignored, especially when they are a minority or seen as non-hostile (e.g, The Twa in Rwanda and Burundi often get ignored and neglected in favour of the focus on Hutus and Tutsis when in conflict or in peace). Peace agreement should not over-represent some communities, simply, because they can damage peace process compared to those who get marginalized and forgotten but whose grievances could as well undermine peace in future.
- (iii). Not to get blindsided by the current conflict and overlook the ways in which bad implementation of R-ARCSS could generate future conflicts (moral: don't try to do everything but don't make things worse by robbing Liwa in order to pay Deng).
- (iv). Beware of the major problem of framing issues to create mental blocks, especially when R-ARCSS is seen to deal with disagreements that have persisted over time. How much of this conflict arises from how the interests of the protagonists are framed? (Example, 'this food is 80% fat free' and 'this food contains 20% bad cholesterol' where the later focuses on the negative minimal while the former framing stresses the positive maximal). Hence, re-framing issues in post-conflict can make conflicts look different and resolvable for peace to prevail in South Sudan.
- (v). Promote extensive civic and political education as required for R-ARCSS implementation. This culture has to be supported through judicial reforms, security sector reforms, national constitutional amendment mechanisms, boundaries commission reviews, restructuring of national legislature, and comprehensive DDR programs to avoid sharp rise in crime committed by those who get disqualified from the armed forces. Collaboration between CSOs and government in these areas can make a difference by enhancing successful outcomes.
- (vi). Support the legitimacy of the state and the government by strengthening communities and improving service delivery (e.g. vaccination, sanitation and nutritional programmes), especially for the returning IDPs and refugees whose resettlement and re-integration should be treated as a priority.
- (vii). Act as honest broker in post conflict situations where residual suspicion and resentment tend to persist for the foreseeable future (e.g., some groups continuing to distrust the opposition for uncorrected past violations and others blaming the government for similar reasons). CSOs that do not have a history of taking sides in a particular conflict can be honest brokers in re-building community relations and in supporting government in peace-building programmes.
- (viii). To demonstrate the value of their contribution, the CSOs must bring resources to the table and be clear about legitimacy, expertise and influence from vantage point of good offices. If the government is struggling for legitimacy in a particular area, the NGOs that possess expertise will be listened to more attentively (e.g., Ufungamano initiative used both its legitimacy and access to expertise to draft an alternative constitution of Kenya in 1995, which was used to lobby for a constitutional reform process).
- (ix). There is a need to build consensus even in the face of divided CSOs, otherwise they become ineffective as some wrongly think that if they cannot agree on everything they should not agree on anything. Coalitions for reforms are not built on the desirable. They are built on the possible. Sometimes if the desirable is pursued too strongly, it makes the possible much harder to achieve. The CSOs should be clear about what they are asking when engaging with government.

- (x). The primary intention of CSOs is to consult and become a player thereafter based on the contributed ideas as part of their participation in making decisions. However, being a direct participant can make the CSOs to lose influence than when staying independent on consultative basis. That is why when government feels bullied into involving CSOs in decision-making, it often formalizes decision-making for retaining control.
- (xi). It is important for CSOs to have reliable information and built-capacity for making factual arguments, which builds both the credibility with government and legitimacy with the community. No matter how much CSOs oppose the policies of government, they should develop back-channels with like-minded officials who they are dealing with and who can cooperate to save lives like what happened in Kenya in the 1990s.
- (xii). Eminent personalities that signed the R-ARCSS as stakeholders must use the leverage of their good offices to help the leadership of the parties build the legitimacy of peace jointly rather than waging costly wars. They should remind them that long-term conflict makes the public to lose sympathy with the leaders, and so when fortunes change such leaders find themselves without support around them. The short-term benefits they appear to gain from conflict could affect their long-term interests (e.g, Jerry Rawlings understood this when he prepared his exit by preparing Ghana to have credible multi-party democracy, which earned him gratitude from Ghanaians who accorded him respect in his retirement and forgave the harmful past for which he would have been locked up in jail).



For the CSOs to play these roles effectively, Mr. Wachira concluded that there should be supportive environment created by the government and opposition gradually. Also IGAD Guarantors, especially Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda need to engage the government of South Sudan with emphasis that inclusive implementation of R-ARCSS is necessary for achieving a comprehensive peace and securing stable legitimacy. This is key to economic recovery and growth that addresses poverty and other factors of under-development.

No matter the magnitude of grievances, it is not wise to get stuck in the past and ignore the opportunities that the future could provide when the present is handled wisely. You cannot drive a car with your eyes on the rear or view mirrors only without focusing on the other surrounding factors too. A good example is Abraham Lincoln in late 1840s who joined the Republican Party which was dominated by some of the best known men of the age but bitter rivals on the Presidency in 1860. The less famous Lincoln not only defeated them but brought them together in one of the most unusual cabinets in US history. Obama used the same logic to appoint his bitter rival, Hillary Clinton as his Secretary of State.

Mr. Wachira Maina regards isolation and boycotts to be more risky compared to continuous engagement of CSOs with the government and the opposition. Alternative ideas should be encouraged and fear of government from powerful opposition should be discarded. Anxiety should be treated as common and natural. Donor capture and favouritism creates resentment from the marginalized and quiet groups of CSOs. The capture makes the CSOs vulnerable, promoting the policies of donors rather than the national interest of the people. South Sudan is rich of natural resources with over 70% youth population (about 6 million) and high fertility rate of its demography. Also South Sudan has high urbanization rate. All these require proper planning of development in a peaceful environment, especially in 10 years to come.

According to him, high government spending on security and armament sector (over 86% of the annual budget) with militarization of big number of youths in the states and local communities should be minimized. The natural resources have to be controlled prudently with more spending on diversified economic investments, particularly in services and production sectors as well as in human resource development of professional skills. This is what Botswana has been doing to become a successful country with largest growth rate in Africa. The opposite has happened in Venezuela, exacerbated by fluctuation of oil prices and the resultant economic crises. This should be avoided by South Sudan together with the political entrepreneurship that attempts to capture the state for individual enrichments rather than promotion of the common good.

Mr. Wachira recommended full and timely implementation of R-ARCSS as vital for right start of putting South Sudan on good track of peace and development. This must be invigorated by those who are more influential on government and parties, including regional leverage of CSOs coalitions and alliances. For example, Kenyan and South African governments failed to pull out from International Criminal Court because of pressure from CSOs coalition. The South Sudanese CSOs coalitions should operate with charter of responsibility and accountability in order to stem out corrupt elements who may tarnish the names of the honest ones. Since government is not monolithic, the CSOs actors should build outreaching back-channels through cooperation with those top officials who have respect and leanings towards issues of common concerns of the citizens.

He noted the crucial role and interest of the Sudan in pushing the peace process forward in South Sudan. There are no sustainable benefits from perpetual conflicts as this can only exhausts the rivals with no victory at the end. That is why all the parties and leaders of South Sudan should treat the implementation of R-ARCSS with sense of urgency, prioritization and inclusivity, including doing what is possible from the

options available. Since transitional justice takes longer time to achieve, it should not be rushed so as to avoid tackling and bundling too many difficult issues at the same pressing time. The conflict entrepreneurs must not be allowed to spread the sentiments of recycled revenge.

According to him, federalism signifies territorial equitability while power sharing is about joint responsibility of rivalling parties to work together without conflicts. Unity government of coalition of parties is only suitable for transitional period. He advised that South Sudan should develop a framework on resource sharing before going federal, especially when oil is not found everywhere in its territory. The government must put oil revenues on sovereign fund to increase its economic bargaining power. It should also use oil revenues to develop the services and production sectors with security of the welfare of the people.

III– THE PILLARS OF ACTION AND WAY FORWARD

The following are the pillars of action that are gleaned from expert talk and deliberations by the participants on the topic of Session thirteen of High-level Breakfast Discussion on the strategic role of Civil Society and Non-Partisan Stakeholders of South Sudan:

- (i). Civil society organizations should actively help in framing issues truthfully and correctly based on consultation for critical well-being of South Sudan but without being captured by anybody or entity, be it internally or externally.
- (ii). Selective or lack of genuine implementation of R-ARCSS should be avoided so that this doesn't lead to renewed conflicts with questioning of legitimacy of the government and opposition, especially when some groups are considered as silent and small to be included in the process in South Sudan.
- (iii). Civil society organizations and eminent persons play a crucial role in mediating for resolution of conflicts and brokering peace deal for rivalling parties using evidence-based advocacy, good offices and pressure on behalf of the citizens.
- (iv). Civil society organizations and faith-based groups have more outreach on promoting extensive civic education, especially when they use effectively the back-channels of government and opposition actors who have better understanding of issues.
- (v). Principled alliances and coordinated strategic networks, including with the region and internationally, put civil society organizations in position of strength and ahead of time to help the parties and government as well as partners in making a peaceful South Sudan where plans for development become achievable.



At the end of session thirteen of Breakfast Discussion, and based on the gleaned pillars from the way forward as presented by the lead expert and the participants, the following analytical policy action points were compiled accurately and practically for wider dissemination. These would help in forging better way forward for cementing peace and promoting development in South Sudan with guarantees of the welfare of the citizens, government and opposition through full implementation of R-ARCSS:

S/N	LEADERSHIP	CITIZENS	STAKEHOLDERS	GUARANTORS	PARTNERS
1.	Acknowledge the important role of CSOs and non-partisans of South Sudan in the peace process as they reflect the real voice of the citizens, including the call for suitable type of federalism.	Support the CSOs and non-partisans of South Sudan in the peace process and link up with them to reflect the real voice of the people accordingly, including the call for suitable type of federalism.	Empower the CSOs and non-partisans of South Sudan in the peace process and developmental dividends, including advocacy for suitable type of federalism.	Recognize the CSOs and non-partisans of South Sudan in the peace process and rely on them to reflect the real voice of the people and call for suitable federalism.	Facilitate the advocacy of CSOs and non-partisans of South Sudan in the peace process, including the call for adoption of suitable type of federalism.
2.	Embrace friendly relations and back-channels with CSOs and non-partisans of South Sudan for tackling the pressing issues of peace and nation-building.	Support the CSOs and non-partisans to have friendly relations and back-channels with government and opposition on issues of peace and nation-building.	Encourage the CSOs and non-partisans to have friendly relations with government and opposition on issues of peace and nation-building.	Ensure that the CSOs and non-partisans of South Sudan to have friendly relations with public officials on issues of developmental peace process.	Empower the CSOs and non-partisans of South Sudan to have friendly relations with public officials on issues of developmental peace process.

3.	Frame the issues of South Sudan on advocacy that emphasises shift of the focus on negative war reactions to positive peace and nationalistic development based on good principles.	Welcome the Framing of issues of South Sudan on advocacy that emphasises shift of focus on war reactions to positive peace and nationalistic development based on good principles.	Assist in the framing of issues of South Sudan with shift from negative to positive advocacy for peace and gradual development based on good principles.	Ensure that the framing of issues of South Sudan shift from negative to positive advocacy for peace and gradual development based on good principles.	Support the shift in framing of issues of South Sudan from negative to positive advocacy for peace and gradual development based on good principles.
4.	Rely on factual evidence and logical sensing when dealing with CSOs and non-partisans as they initiate objective mediation and pressure for peace and common good of South Sudan.	Call for factual evidence and logical sensing by the CSOs and non-partisans as they initiate objective mediation and pressure for peace and common good to prevail in South Sudan.	Provide factual evidence and logical sensing for CSOs and non-partisans as they initiate objective mediation and pressure for peace and common good to prevail in South Sudan.	Encourage factual and evidence-based logical advocacy by CSOs and non-partisans for mediation with pressure that will enable peace and common good to prevail in South Sudan.	Support factual and evidence-based logical advocacy by CSOs and non-partisans for mediation with pressure that will enable peace and common good to prevail in South Sudan.
5.	Encourage strong alliance and networking coalitions by the CSOs so that they can contribute to peace and development of South Sudan in a united manner without wakening contradictions.	Support strong alliance and networking coalitions by the CSOs so that they can contribute to peace and development of South Sudan in a united manner without lame contradictions.	Generate strong alliance and networking coalitions for CSOs so that they can contribute to peace and development of South Sudan with united voices.	Inspire strong alliance and networking coalitions for CSOs so that they can contribute to peace and development of South Sudan with united voices.	Stimulate strong alliance and networking coalitions for CSOs so that they can contribute to peace and development of South Sudan with united voices.
6.	Base the critical public decisions on consultation with CSOs and non-partisans without intention of capturing them to promote what the government want even when this does not serve what the citizens want.	Call for taking of critical public decisions based on consultation with CSOs and non-partisans to promote what the people want rather than what government desire regardless of the common good of citizens.	Help the public officials to take decisions based on consultation with CSOs and non-partisans to promote what the people want and persuade government to fulfil it as the common good.	Encourage the public officials to take decisions based on consultation with CSOs and non-partisans to promote what the people want as the common good of the citizens.	Persuade the public officials to take decisions based on consultation with CSOs and non-partisans to promote what the people want as the common good of the citizens.

7.	Develop the concept of 'loyal opposition' so as to appreciate the alternative views that complement the efforts for peace and development of South Sudan from different perspectives.	Promote the concept of 'loyal opposition' so as to appreciate the alternative views that complement the efforts for peace and development in South Sudan from different perspectives.	Act as 'loyal opposition' on initiating alternative views and advocacy on issues of the common good, especially the matters of peace and development.	Ensure that the notion of 'loyal opposition' is appreciated in South Sudan, including its promotion by CSOs and non-partisans who initiate good views and actions.	Encourage the recognition of 'loyal opposition' in South Sudan, including its promotion by CSOs and non-partisans who initiate good views and actions.
8.	Build inclusive consensus for formation of RTGoNU so as to avoid negative reaction by groups that feel undermined or made to go silent despite their genuine unresolved grievances.	Call for inclusive consensus on formation of RTGoNU so as to avoid negative reaction by groups that feel undermined or made to go silent despite their genuine unresolved grievances.	Assist the parties to build inclusive consensus for formation of RTGoNU so as to avoid the reaction by groups that feel undermined or silenced despite their genuine grievances.	Persuade the parties to build inclusive consensus for formation of RTGoNU so as to avoid the reaction by groups that feel undermined or silenced despite their genuine grievances.	Support the parties to build inclusive consensus for formation of RTGoNU so as to avoid the reaction by groups that feel undermined or silenced despite their genuine grievances.
9.	Focus on utilizing the opportunities that the future can provide for South Sudan without wasting energies on dwelling in the past instead of learning from it correctly for soft landing and dignified exit from fragilities.	Utilizing the opportunities that the future can provide for South Sudan without wasting energies on dwelling in the past instead of learning from it correctly for soft landing and dignified exit from fragilities.	Articulate the opportunities that the future can provide for South Sudan without wasting energies on dwelling in the past instead of learning from it correctly for soft landing and dignified exit from fragilities.	Identify the opportunities that the future can provide for South Sudan without wasting energies on dwelling in the past instead of learning from it correctly for soft landing and dignified exit from fragilities.	Capitalize on opportunities that the future can provide for South Sudan without wasting energies on dwelling in the past instead of learning from it correctly for soft landing and dignified exit from fragilities.

ABOUT THE CENTER

South Sudan Center for Strategic and Policy Studies (CSPS) was established in July 2011 with aims of participating in the development of the country through applied research to enhance the debate on governance, nation and state-building in South Sudan, with the purpose of adding objectivity, critical thinking, nurturing strategic thinking, progressive and well-informed leadership.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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