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# MONITOR



**AUGUST** 2025

# SUDAN

## INSIGHTS ON THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL (PSC)

### BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION IN SUDAN

3<sup>RD</sup> AUGUST 2025

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Tomorrow (4 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) will hold its first session of the month to consider the situation in Sudan.

The session will commence with an opening remark by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for August 2025. This is followed by introductory statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. A representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is also expected to make a statement. It is also envisaged that the PSC receives a statement on the humanitarian situation, including access to humanitarian assistance and food insecurity, from Haneed Nuru, Director of the World Food Programme African Union Global Office. Since Sudan is suspended following the October 2021 coup that laid the foundation for the eruption of the conflict in April 2023, it would not accordingly be invited to make a statement during the session.

There have been major developments since the PSC's last substantive session in February 2025. The frontlines of the fighting and the territorial control of the major parties to the war – the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have substantially shifted. At the end of March, the SAF succeeded in wresting control of Khartoum from RSF. On its part, the RSF expanded its offensive

in May to the East by launching long-range drone attacks that targeted various cities, including Port Sudan. These attacks targeted key civilian and military infrastructure, including the international airport, a military airbase, fuel depots, and power stations.

Despite shifts in the battlefield dynamics, the warring parties remain entrenched in their positions and appear determined to pursue a military solution. As each tries to consolidate its respective areas of control and inflict loss on the other, the focus of the terrain of fighting has shifted. As a result, the fighting now appears to be shifting southward into Kordofan and eastward in Darfur. The ongoing fighting in Kordofan has reportedly resulted in the massive displacement of people and the collapse of essential services. As the RSF shifted its focus to consolidate its control in Darfur, it intensified its siege and attacks on North Darfur's capital, El Fasher, through shelling, drone strikes, and ground operations, exacerbating the already dire humanitarian and hunger conditions in the besieged city and its environs. In July, the United Nations called on the warring parties to agree to a humanitarian pause in the besieged city. While the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) reportedly accepted the proposal, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) rejected it. Indicating further expansion of the

war front, in June, the RSF claimed control of the tri-border area of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, both to expand the supply line through Libya and extend the fighting into the Nile Valley and Northern State.

With the war showing no sign of abating, the dire humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, as the statement from the WFP representative would make clear. Indiscriminate attacks against civilians continue. The RSF long-range drone attacks targeted not only military targets but also civilian infrastructures, including the 10 May 2025 bombing that attacked the central prison in El Obeid, reportedly resulting in the death of 29 prisoners and injuring dozens more. In an incident attributed to the SAF, the bombing on 21 June on the Al-Mujlad hospital in West Kordofan reportedly resulted in the killing of more than 40 people, including six children and five healthcare workers. Sudan remains the world's largest humanitarian crisis, with over 30 million people in need of assistance.

As they both deepen their effort to consolidate their respective territorial control, they are also seeking to translate territorial control into political influence. SAF has regained control over parts of the east and centre of the country, including the capital, Khartoum. Meanwhile, RSF is working to consolidate its hold in the west and south, particularly in Darfur and South Kordofan. In May, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council, appointed Kamal Idris as the new prime minister. Idris subsequently dissolved the existing government in June and is currently consulting on the formation of a new cabinet. On 26 July, the RSF-led coalition, known as the Tasis Alliance, also announced the formation of a parallel government, with RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo appointing Mohamed Hassan al-Ta'ishi as prime minister.

The emergence of rival governments in the respective territorial spheres of influence of the two rival warring parties has raised renewed fears of Sudan's potential fragmentation, drawing comparisons to the situation in Libya. It is against this backdrop that tomorrow's session is scheduled. The UN Security Council is also set to hold closed consultations on the situation in Sudan on the same day.

Tomorrow's session comes less than a week after the PSC issued a statement. The statement, issued on 29 July, was issued in direct response to and with exclusive focus on the 26 July 2025 announcement by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of the establishment of a parallel civilian administration, referred to as the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis) in areas under its control. This is not the first time the PSC has issued a statement condemning the RSF's initiative for establishing a parallel government. Condemning the announcement on the establishment of such a parallel government by the RSF, in an earlier statement issued on 11 March, the PSC warned that 'such action carries a huge risk of partitioning of the country.' While both statements explicitly stated that the PSC does not recognise the parallel government, reaffirmed the unity and territorial integrity of Sudan and urged all AU member states and the international community not to recognise any parallel government, the 11 March statement additionally reaffirmed the AU's 'unwavering commitment **to continue to collaborate with all Sudanese stakeholders** towards finding viable and durable solutions towards silencing the guns permanently in Sudan' on the basis of the AU roadmap (emphasis added). By contrast, in a clear departure from this 'commitment to continue to collaborate with all Sudanese stakeholders', the 29 July statement asserted that the 'African Union only recognises the Transitional Sovereign Council and the recently formed civilian transitional government.' The 'civilian transitional

government' that this statement makes reference to is the appointment by Chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council, General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) chief, of Kamil al-Tayeb Idris as a civilian Prime Minister. The PSC's recognition of the so-called 'civilian transitional government' follows the statement of 30 May 2025 by the AU Commission Chairperson, who described the appointment of the prime minister 'as a step towards inclusive governance'.

**There are fears that this shift in the policy position of the PSC and the AUC may resuscitate the agenda of lifting the suspension of Sudan from the AU.** However, there is no inclusive political process and national dialogue involving diverse political and social forces of Sudan, nor is there any transitional roadmap developed through such a political process and national dialogue. With the war raging on with no end in sight, neither national constitution-making nor general national elections are on the horizon. As the recent experience in Gabon illustrates, even with such processes and a roadmap, the constitutional order is not considered to have been restored before the convening of general national elections. As such, any lifting of the suspension of Sudan at this point could not happen without breaking the AU norm on unconstitutional change of government.

Despite the worsening security and humanitarian situation in the Sudan, ongoing mediation efforts aimed at reaching a diplomatic resolution have made limited progress, with little prospect of securing a ceasefire. The involvement of multiple actors in these initiatives has further complicated the peace process. In May, the United Nations, African Union, and the League of Arab States held a tripartite meeting in Baghdad, Iraq, aimed at promoting greater synergy in their engagement on the Sudan file. They apparently intend to include IGAD in future meetings under this format. In June, the European

Union convened a consultative meeting in Brussels on enhancing coordination of peace initiatives and efforts for Sudan, bringing together several key actors involved in the peace process. The next meeting is expected to take place in Addis Ababa.

In the meantime, the United States appears to be shifting its focus to Sudan, building on its recent success in mediating between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. It had planned to host a meeting of the Quad—comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—in Washington, D.C., on 30 July, with the aim of advancing the Sudan peace talks. However, the meeting was reportedly postponed due to disagreements over the anticipated outcome. Similarly, an earlier conference on Sudan convened by the United Kingdom in London in April failed to produce results, also due to disagreements over the terms of a joint declaration.

The ongoing conflict in Sudan has been further complicated by the involvement of external actors and the use of modern warfare technologies, including unmanned aerial vehicles. Despite the existing UN arms embargo, the flow of weapons into the country has continued unabated, fueling the violence and having a devastating impact on civilians. The conflict has also had far-reaching consequences for the broader region.

All seven of Sudan's neighbouring countries have been affected to varying degrees. In particular, the situation in Abyei—a disputed border area between Sudan and South Sudan—has significantly worsened. The conflict has exacerbated intercommunal tensions, increased displacement, and undermined ongoing peace efforts. The spillover effect has also been evident in the presence of RSF elements across borders and a sharp increase in cross-border movements, including refugees and returnees. Recent fighting in the tri-border area of Sudan, Libya, and

Egypt involving SAF, RSF, and armed groups affiliated with the Libyan National Army—led by General Khalifa Haftar—has raised concern that it could spark another regional tension.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its grave concern over the continuation of fighting in Sudan without any sign of a major breakthrough for peace. It may reiterate its earlier calls on the imperative for ending the fighting in Sudan, calling for a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. It may also condemn the indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians, including the incidents that led to civilian deaths in El Obeid and West Darfur, and state that those responsible for violations against civilians will be held accountable. The PSC may also call for an end to hostilities in Kordofan and the lifting of the siege that the RSF imposed on El Fasher, worsening the dire humanitarian and hunger crises in the city and its environs. It may also reiterate the imperative for unhindered and safe humanitarian access to ameliorate the humanitarian catastrophe and urge the parties to ensure civilian protection. It is expected that the PSC will restate its position expressed in the 11 March 2025 and 29 July 2025 statements, rejecting and condemning the establishment of parallel governments by the RSF and calling on all AU member states and the international community not to recognise the establishment of the parallel government announced by the RSF on 26 July 2025. While the PSC may not return to its 11 March 2025 statement in which it expressed AU's commitment to continue to collaborate with all Sudanese stakeholders, it may make it clear that its recognition of the Transitional Sovereign Council in pursuit of safeguarding the territorial integrity of Sudan does not dispense with the need for a political process for the establishment of an all-inclusive transitional government and for finding diplomatic resolution of the current conflict. It may, in this regard, reaffirm its commitment to the May 2023 AU roadmap for the resolution of the conflict in Sudan and that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Sudan. The PSC may also affirm the need for an all-inclusive political process and national dialogue for developing a transitional roadmap, covering constitution-making and holding of general national elections, in order to achieve restoration of constitutional order, for which bringing the war to an end is essential. On the peace process, the PSC is expected to call for the integration of all initiatives for peace in Sudan into a single process. It may also call for the AU to assert a leading role in facilitating such a single peace process for Sudan.

Source: [Briefing on the situation in Sudan – Amani Africa](#)

## SECURITY COUNCIL SEP 2025 MONTHLY FORECAST

### AUGUST 30<sup>TH</sup> 2025

THE UN Security Council is to vote on draft resolution to extend Sudan sanctions regime which expires on 12 September.

Meanwhile, in **Kordofan** continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement,

and further worsening the humanitarian situation.

In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been **unable** to deliver food by road for over

a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was **hit** by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June **attack** on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma.

## EXPECTED COUNCIL ACTION

In September, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution to extend the Sudan sanctions regime, which expires on 12 September.

The mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee expires on 12 March 2026.

## KEY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. In recent months, the fighting has centred around North Darfur state and the Kordofan region, witnessing an alarming escalation in hostilities.

Civilians have borne the brunt of the fighting, which has been marked by heavy use of drones, artillery, ground operations, and airstrikes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and raising concerns about widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

On 11 August, at least 57 civilians were killed when the RSF **conducted** a large-scale assault on El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, besieged by the RSF since May 2024, and the Abu Shouk IDP camp.

On 16 August, Abu Shouk was **hit** by RSF artillery fire, killing at least 31 people, including seven children. These attacks follow months of intensified shelling, drone strikes, and blockade tactics that have **cut off** escape routes and trapped civilians inside the city. The other IDP camp adjoining El Fasher, Zamzam camp, was seized by the RSF in mid-April, resulting in hundreds of thousands

Escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict and there are frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

of people fleeing to nearby areas, mostly to Tawila, a town in North Darfur state.

In late July, the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (known as "Tasis")—a coalition of armed and political groups—**announced** the formation of a parallel government in RSF-held areas. In a 13 August **press statement**, Council members rejected this announcement and expressed concern that it threatens Sudan's unity and risks further fragmentation. Members reiterated that priority should be given to resuming talks towards a lasting ceasefire and creating conditions for re-establishing a credible and inclusive political transition towards a democratically elected national government following a civilian-led transitional period, in line with the principles of national ownership.

The US appears to be trying to reinvigorate efforts to advance peace talks in Sudan, in coordination with regional and international

partners. It had planned to host a foreign ministers' meeting of the Quad countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—on 29 July, but according to **media reports**, the meeting has been indefinitely postponed. (For more information, see our **26 June** and **4 August** What's in Blue stories.)

On 11 August, US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos **met** with the SAF's leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in Zurich. This meeting, reportedly facilitated by Qatar, was the highest-level US-Sudan engagement since US President Donald Trump assumed office earlier this year. **Media reports** suggest that both sides discussed a peace plan proposed by the US for a comprehensive ceasefire and expanded humanitarian access. At the time of writing, neither side had issued any official readout of the meeting.

While humanitarian conditions in Sudan continue to deteriorate, access remains severely constrained in areas of active fighting,

leaving civilians trapped in dire conditions and resorting to desperate coping strategies, including eating animal feed and food waste. According to the **Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs** (OCHA), access remained particularly restricted in North Darfur state, Greater Kordofan, and the Nuba Mountains regions. In **Kordofan**, continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been **unable** to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was **hit** by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June **attack** on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma.

## HUMAN RIGHTS-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Between 27 and 31 July, Radhouane Nouicer, the UN-designated expert on human rights in Sudan, visited Port Sudan, where he met with Sudanese officials, UN representatives, humanitarian partners, and civil society organisations to assess the human rights situation amid the ongoing conflict. In a **press release** issued following the visit, Nouicer expressed grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights conditions, noting that escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. He highlighted reports of extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, and arbitrary detention, and underlined the need for sustained commitments to justice, accountability, and inclusive governance. Nouicer urged the international community to enforce the arms embargo, support local peacebuilding initiatives, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access.

## WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

On 19 August, Ikhlass Ahmed, founder and coordinator of the civil society organisation Darfur Advocacy Group, briefed the Council at the annual open debate on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). She underscored that CRSV has become a defining feature of the war in Sudan. While noting that CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, Ahmed stressed that the RSF is "committing these violations in an organised, widespread and systematic manner", particularly targeting women and girls based on their ethnicity. She also underscored that impunity has emboldened the SAF to commit sexual violence.

Ahmed noted that support for victims of CRSV in Sudan is “nowhere close to meeting the overwhelming needs” of survivors, amid a lack of emergency contraception, prophylaxis and safe abortion services. She also highlighted frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

## KEY ISSUES AND OPTIONS

An immediate issue for the Council is the extension of the Sudan sanctions regime (targeted sanctions and the arms embargo). Ensuring strict compliance with the sanctions regime, amid reports of continuous supply and use of foreign weapons and mercenaries in the Darfur region, is a major issue in this regard. As well, ensuring accountability for violations of international humanitarian, human rights law, and other atrocities remains a paramount issue. One option for the Council members is to extend the sanctions regime for one year.

In light of apparent violations of the sanctions regime and the evolving political and security dynamics in Sudan and the wider region, Council members could consider requesting the Secretary-General to conduct an independent assessment to assess the underlying drivers of instability. Such an assessment could also identify how the Council’s existing tools might be better adapted to respond effectively to the situation.

Although the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 March 2026 through **resolution 2772** of 17 February, members have not been able to agree on its composition. In late February, the Secretary-General proposed five experts to serve on the Panel, but some Council members subsequently placed holds on the appointments. As a result, the Panel has not yet been constituted and is unable to carry out its work, including the submission of the interim report, due on 12 August, and the quarterly updates mandated by resolution 2772.

In this respect, one option for Council members is to convene an informal meeting of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee to discuss ways of

Ahmed called on the Council to demand that all conflict parties fully comply with resolution 2736 of 13 June 2024, which called for an immediate halt to the fighting and demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher. In the absence of a ceasefire, she stressed the criticality of the protection of civilians and of ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. Ahmed also called on the Council to demand an immediate end to CRSV by all conflict parties and to condemn the targeting of women human rights defenders and frontline workers.

breaking the impasse in appointing the Panel. Another option would be to address the matter at the Council level, rather than in a subsidiary body level, with members discussing it in either closed consultations or under “any other business”.

During the negotiations in September, some Council members may wish to have a substantive discussion about the sanctions measures, including, but not limited to, enlarging the geographical scope of the measures to the other parts of the country, expanding the designation criteria, and listing more individuals and entities under the current regime. As part of this discussion, some members may raise the issue of aligning the mandate of the sanctions regime with that of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.

The overarching issue for the Council is how to bring an end to the ongoing fighting and support efforts towards a sustainable ceasefire across Sudan and a civilian-led political transition. The continued violence, insecurity, and targeted attacks against civilians, civilian and humanitarian

infrastructure, remain a major concern for Council members. As well, with hostilities continuing, mediation efforts have consistently failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs. Council members could consider holding an informal interactive dialogue with key regional and international

stakeholders—including representatives of regional and sub-regional organisations and states involved in mediation efforts—to explore ways to leverage their comparative advantages and harmonise their efforts in support of a coherent political strategy to the crisis.

## COUNCIL DYNAMICS

Council members recognise that external interference has fuelled conflict and instability in Sudan and have urged all states to refrain from such actions, support efforts for a durable peace, comply with their obligations under international law, and implement relevant Council resolutions on sanctions in Darfur. Members, however, have diverging views on the utility of the sanctions regime. Several have stressed the importance of maintaining the measures in light of ongoing violence in Darfur and the Panel of Experts' role in monitoring the humanitarian and security situation and identifying violations. Russia has argued that sanctions have failed to stabilise the region, pointing to the continued flow of weapons into Darfur. In their explanation of vote on resolution 2772, the "A3 plus" members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) called for a "principled approach" that advances a resolution to the crisis, while ensuring that Council-imposed measures remain balanced and constructive.

Council members also have diverging views on how to adapt the Council's tools to the evolving security situation in the country. Some, such as France, have advocated expanding the geographical scope of sanctions beyond Darfur to other conflict-affected parts of the country. Other members have also expressed support for the application of targeted measures against individuals responsible for atrocities and sanctions violations. However, the "A3 plus" members, China, and Russia, have opposed expanding the scope of the sanctions regime. Russia, in particular, has stated that it considers "unacceptable even any hint of extending the sanctions regime beyond Darfur".

A recurrent issue in recent negotiations on the Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts has been the duration of the mandates. The "A3 plus" members, China, Pakistan, and Russia, have supported shorter

renewals, arguing that aligning the duration of both mandates would avoid a situation where the Panel's reporting period extends beyond that of the sanctions regime itself. These members argued that such an arrangement effectively prejudices the extension of the regime, while noting that this alignment is consistent with the Council's practice in other sanctions regimes. In their explanation of votes, following the adoption of resolution 2772, "A3 plus members" and China indicated that they anticipate a thorough discussion on this issue when the sanctions regime comes up for renewal in September. On the other hand, the penholder and like-minded members have favoured longer mandates to ensure continuity and predictability in the panel's reporting.

The UK is the penholder on Sudan, and the US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions.

Source: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-09/sudan-37.php>

# ETHIOPIA

## WHY ETHIOPIA'S TIGRAY COULD BE ON THE BRINK OF ANOTHER CONFLICT

### FEARS OF INSTABILITY RISE AGAIN AS THE TPLF AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE GEARING UP FOR A SHOWDOWN.

25<sup>TH</sup> AUGUST 2025

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An eerily familiar set of headlines is making the rounds in Ethiopia, troubling many in the fragile, northern Tigray region.

Successive delegations of civil society and religious leaders have, in recent weeks, travelled to the Tigrayan capital, Mekelle, for "dialogue". For some, it is a reminder of the events that played out in the final weeks before Tigray descended into war in November 2020.

That war left 600,000 people dead and some five million displaced. It brought global attention to Ethiopia's fractured politics and tarnished the reputation of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who had won a Nobel Peace Prize for mending long-severed ties with neighbouring Eritrea.

A ceasefire two years later was supposed to end the war; instead, analysts say, [another conflict might be looming](#). This time, it could involve not just the Tigrayan regional authorities, but also Eritrea, and potentially, that country's own allies. It is not a conflict that the region can withstand, experts fear.

#### PEACE AGREEMENT PUSHED ASIDE

War broke out in Tigray in November 2020 after Ethiopia's Abiy accused the TPLF of attacking a command centre of the national army, the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF).

For decades, the TPLF dominated the ruling coalition in Addis Ababa in what experts say

"We are now at a point where we are all frightened at another conflict in Tigray, and with Eritrea," analyst Abel Abate Demissie of the Chatham House think tank in the United Kingdom told Al Jazeera. "It would be extremely devastating."

Fractured [agreements](#) signed back in November 2022 that ended the war between the regional Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government are at the root of the tensions. However, it is the deepening resentment between neighbours Eritrea and Ethiopia that analysts say is the scariest development th Ethiopia is a key player in East Africa, and war there could derail regional stability as neighbouring Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia deal with ongoing armed conflict. It could also affect Africa's self-reliance in the aviation sector, as Addis Ababa is one of Africa's most important air travel hubs.is time.

was an autocratic system. The group was disliked in nearly all 10 regions of Ethiopia,

a country where regions form along ethnic lines. Eritrea, which fought a border war with TPLF-dominated Ethiopia in 1998, also had gripes with the party. When Abiy, an Oromo, was elected in 2018, though, he established peaceful ties with Eritrea and set about implementing reforms for a stronger central government. The TPLF, however, saw Abiy's moves as a threat to its power and sought to overthrow his government.

Addis Ababa, in its military response to the TPLF attack, teamed up with other TPLF-opposed entities, including the Amhara army and allied militias, as well as Eritrean forces. All sides were accused of attacking civilians; however, rights groups also accused the federal government of deliberately blocking aid to Tigrayans and causing a near-famine. The United States called attacks by Amhara militias "ethnic cleansing" while many Tigrayans claim the war was a genocide. Many were forcibly displaced from western Tigray, which the Amhara region claims. Thousands of women were raped.

In November 2022, Addis Ababa and TPLF signed the Pretoria peace agreement. The ceasefire deal mandated that the TPLF disarm and a new government be jointly appointed by both sides. It also mandated that Addis Ababa oversee the safe return of displaced people and that all third-party armies withdraw.

However, a power struggle emerged in the TPLF between the Abiy-appointed Tigray mayor, Getachew Reda, and the TPLF head, Debretsion Gebremichael. It began when Getachew attempted to implement the disarmament clause. Core TPLF members, however, accused him of being a sellout. In [March](#), the TPLF faction aligned with Debretsion staged a coup, seized the Mekelle radio station, and forced

Getachew to leave Mekelle for Addis Ababa. The coup was a direct affront to Abiy, analysts say. Although he has since appointed another interim president from Debretsion's camp, Addis Ababa and TPLF have traded insults and threatened attacks.

"Both sides have downplayed their responsibility," said Abel of Chatham House, speaking of how both sides appear to have moved away from the Pretoria agreement. The TPLF accuses Addis Ababa of failing to resettle people, with some 1.6 million still displaced, and is threatening to forcibly return them. It also blames the government for revoking its licence as a political party, although the national electoral body says it is because the TPLF has failed to hold a general assembly as it previously mandated.

Addis Ababa, on the other hand, has faulted the TPLF for failing to disarm, and also accuses the party of allying with Eritrea.

In a speech in parliament in July, Abiy urged religious leaders and civil society members to warn TPLF leaders against escalation, because when conflict starts, "it would be too late".

Getachew, who has been expelled from the TPLF, has formed a new party, the Tigray Democratic Solidarity Party. Analysts say it is possible that the party might be installed in Tigray instead.

Meanwhile, Amhara militias and the TPLF continue to clash. Many young people who joined the TPLF in the 2020 war have defected to form new militias allied with Getachew's faction and attempted an attack on the TPLF in July.

## THE PROBLEM WITH ERITREA

Ethiopia's perpetual entanglement with Eritrea has taken on a different dimension since 2020, with both again at loggerheads.

Cracks appeared in their parley after Abiy's government agreed to peace with the TPLF. President Isaias Afwerki, who has been Eritrea's de facto leader since 1994, was reportedly angered as he did not feel sufficiently consulted, even as Eritrean troops are still in Tigray.

A bigger problem, however, is Abiy's comments since 2023 about landlocked Ethiopia's "existential" need to access a seaport. Asmara has taken those statements as a threat that Addis Ababa might invade and seize the coastal areas it previously lost after Eritrea fought to secede in 1993. In one comment, Abiy described Ethiopia losing sea access as a "historical mistake".

Since then, Eritrea has been building up defences, sending military tanks to the border, according to analysts, with Ethiopia doing the same. In February, Eritrea put out calls for conscription into the army. Asmara is also reportedly in cahoots with the TPLF to undermine Abiy, although officials deny this.

Both sides do not really want to go to war and are merely posturing, analyst Abel said. Eritrea would meet in Addis Ababa a formidable

enemy, and Ethiopia is not eager to mar its reputation as a growing regional leader where the African Union has its headquarters.

"The problem, though, is it only takes one small act to ignite a war, even if both sides don't want it," the analyst said.

In March, Abiy attempted to downplay the tensions while speaking in parliament.

"Our intention is to negotiate based on the principle of give and take," he said, implying that any port deals would be commercial. "Our plan is not to fight but to work together and grow together."

It is not only Asmara that has been angered by Abiy's bid to find a port. Neighbouring Somalia nearly declared war last year after Abiy sealed a port deal with the self-declared state of Somaliland. Somalia, which views Somaliland as part of its territory, was furious, but Turkiye, Somalia's close ally, mediated repairs between the two in December. Before they reconciled, Eritrea held meetings with Somalia, as well as Egypt, which is also angry with Addis Ababa over the Grand Renaissance Dam, which it says will limit its water supply from the Nile.

## CAN ALL SIDES FIND PEACE?

Analysts say the work of finding common ground rests mostly with Abiy as Asmara, for one, is not strong on diplomacy, and the TPLF appears more confident with reported Eritrean backing.

The big unknown is whether Abiy is willing and able to restore ties with either the TPLF or Eritrea without either side feeling sidelined. In the background, as well, are the Amhara militias who are still present in disputed western Tigray. Any attempts to remove them could lead to conflict.

In any case, Abiy is already suffering a crisis of legitimacy, analyst Micheal Tsegay Assefa concluded in a brief for the Atlas Institute for International Affairs.

"Regional leaders, particularly from Amhara and Oromia, increasingly question the central

government's capacity to secure peace and manage inter-regional conflicts," he wrote, due to Addis Ababa's inability to enforce the peace deal.

Meanwhile, as the sabre-rattling continues, Tigrayans are once again fearing for their lives. The recent tensions have sent scores of people fleeing from the region, with some risking deadly routes to get out of the country altogether.

Researchers say Ethiopian migrants attempting, and dying, to enter Yemen via the Gulf of Aden increasingly appear to be from Tigray, based on the clothing or jewellery found by rescuers during shipwrecks.

Analysts say another war simply must not happen.

"Conflict only needs one side to go rogue," Abel said. "I really hope that sanity will prevail and all sides will apply wisdom."

Source: [Why Ethiopia's Tigray could be on the brink of another conflict | Abiy Ahmed News | Al Jazeera](#)

## ETHIOPIAN INVESTMENT HOLDINGS AND DANGOTE GROUP SIGN LANDMARK SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT FOR \$2.5 BILLION, 3 MILLION METRIC TONS UREA FERTILIZER PRODUCTION COMPLEX IN GODE, ETHIOPIA

AUG 28<sup>TH</sup> 2025

Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH), the strategic investment arm of the Government of Ethiopia, and Dangote Group today announced the signing of a comprehensive shareholders' agreement to develop, construct, and operate a world-class urea fertilizer production complex in Gode, Ethiopia. Under the partnership structure, EIH will hold a 40% equity stake while Dangote Group will maintain 60% ownership of the transformative project that represents one of the largest industrial investments in Ethiopian history.

### PROJECT OVERVIEW

The ambitious project will establish one of the world's largest single-site urea fertilizer production complexes, with production facilities boasting a combined capacity of up to three million metric tons per annum. This capacity positions the Gode facility among the top five largest urea production complexes globally. Under the agreement, the two entities will jointly finance, own, construct, and operate the state-of-the-art urea fertilizer plants and associated infrastructure. The comprehensive

development includes a pipeline to transport natural gas from a gas processing facility in Calub and Hilala gas fields.

The agreement also outlines potential expansions, upgrades, and new initiatives in the production of ammonia-based fertilizers, including ammonium nitrate, ammonium sulfate, and calcium ammonium nitrate, further strengthening Ethiopia's position as a regional hub for fertilizer production.

### INVESTMENT AND TIMELINE

The Project Development Costs are estimated not to exceed \$2.5 billion USD, with completion targeted within 40 months from commencement. This substantial investment underscores the commitment of both entities to transforming Ethiopia's agricultural sector and enhancing food

security across the region. The project is expected to significantly reduce Ethiopia's dependence on fertilizer imports while creating thousands of direct and indirect employment opportunities in the Somali Regional State and beyond.

Aliko Dangote, Chairman of Dangote Group, commented: "This partnership with Ethiopian Investment Holdings represents a pivotal moment in our shared vision to industrialize Africa and achieve food security across the continent. The strategic location of Gode, combined with Ethiopia's abundant natural gas resources from the Hilala and Calub reserves, makes this an ideal location for what will become one of the world's largest fertilizer complexes. We are committed to bringing our decades of experience in large-scale industrial projects to ensure this venture becomes a cornerstone of Ethiopia's industrial transformation and a catalyst for agricultural productivity throughout the region. The 60-40 partnership structure reflects our commitment to this transformative project while ensuring strong Ethiopian participation."

Dr. Brook Taye, Chief Executive Officer of Ethiopian Investment Holdings, stated: "This

landmark agreement with Dangote Group marks a significant milestone in Ethiopia's journey toward industrial self-sufficiency and agricultural modernization. As the strategic investment arm of the Government of Ethiopia, EIH is proud to secure a 40% stake in what will be one of the world's largest urea production facilities. The project aligns perfectly with our national development priorities and will substantially enhance our agricultural productivity while positioning Ethiopia as a regional hub for fertilizer production. The utilization of our domestic Hilala and Calub gas reserves through dedicated pipeline infrastructure ensures energy security and cost competitiveness for decades to come. We are confident that this partnership will deliver tremendous value to Ethiopian farmers, contribute to food security, and generate substantial economic benefits for our nation."

## STRATEGIC IMPACT

The Gode fertilizer complex will play a crucial role in supporting Ethiopia's agricultural sector, which employs over 70% of the country's population. By ensuring reliable access to high-quality fertilizers at competitive prices, the project is expected to boost crop yields, improve farmer incomes, and contribute to national food security objectives. The project positions Ethiopia as a major player in the global fertilizer market and a key supplier for the African continent. The partnership leverages Dangote Industries' proven track record in large-scale industrial projects across Africa and Ethiopian Investment Holdings' role as the government's strategic investment vehicle with deep understanding of the local market and regulatory environment. The project also supports broader regional integration objectives by creating a reliable supply of fertilizers for neighboring countries, potentially reducing import costs and improving agricultural productivity across East Africa and beyond.

## ABOUT ETHIOPIAN INVESTMENT HOLDINGS

Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH) is the strategic investment arm of the Government of Ethiopia, established in 2021 to manage and optimize state-owned commercial assets. With a focus on long-term value creation,

EIH owns and manages some 40 state-owned enterprises, including Ethiopian Airlines, Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Ethio Telecom, and Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics. The fund aims to position Ethiopia as a key player

in global investment markets by acquiring strategic stakes in both domestic and

international enterprises.

## ABOUT DANGOTE GROUP

Dangote Group is Africa's leading industrial conglomerate with operations spanning cement, fertilizer, petrochemicals, and other key sectors across the continent. The company

is committed to industrializing Africa and improving lives through strategic investments in critical infrastructure and manufacturing.

Source: [Ethiopian Investment Holdings and Dangote Group Sign Landmark Shareholders' Agreement for \\$2.5 Billion, 3 million Metric Tons Urea Fertilizer Production Complex in Gode, Ethiopia | ETHIOPIANS TODAY](#)

## SOUTH SUDAN

# ISRAEL IN TALKS TO RESETTLE GAZA PALESTINIANS IN SOUTH SUDAN, SOURCES SAY. SOUTH SUDAN DENIES SUCH TALKS

AUGUST 16<sup>TH</sup> 2025

"MANY world leaders are horrified at the idea of displacing the Gaza population, which Palestinians say would be like another "Nakba" (catastrophe) when hundreds of thousands fled or were forced out during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

South Sudan's Foreign Minister Monday Semaya Kumba visited Israel last month and met with Netanyahu, according to the foreign ministry in Juba.

Netanyahu said this month he intends to extend military control in Gaza, and this week repeated suggestions that Palestinians should leave the territory voluntarily.

South Sudan is not in talks with Israel to resettle Palestinians from war-torn Gaza, South Sudan's foreign ministry said on Wednesday.

In March, Somalia and its breakaway region of Somaliland also denied receiving any proposal from the United States or Israel to resettle Palestinians from Gaza, with Mogadishu saying it categorically rejected any such move.

The plan, if carried further, would envisage people moving from an enclave shattered by almost two years of war with Israel to a nation South Sudan in the heart of Africa riven by years of political and ethnically-driven violence.»

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: This terrible plan must not be accepted by South Sudan. At least 25 million displaced Sudanese in and around Sudan and South Sudan are struggling to stay alive. South Sudan, one of the most dangerous countries in the world, does not have the infrastructure and security to support and protect her own people. It would be horrendous for all involved, including Palestinians.

Here is a report by Reuters. Reporting by Nairobi Newsroom; additional reporting by Alexander Cornwell at the

Israel-Gaza border, Maayan Lubell in Jerusalem, Nidal al-Mughrabi in Cairo and David Brunnstrom in Washington; Writing by Ammu Kannampilly; Editing by Andrew Heavens and Diane Craft

Dated Saturday, 16 August 2025 - full copy:

Palestinians carry aid supplies they collected from trucks that entered Gaza through Israel, in Beit Lahia, in the northern Gaza Strip August 10, 2025. REUTERS/Dawoud Abu Alkas/File Photo

NAIROBI, Aug 15 (Reuters) - South Sudan and Israel are discussing a deal to resettle Palestinians from war-torn Gaza in the troubled African nation, three sources told Reuters - a plan quickly dismissed as unacceptable by Palestinian leaders.

The sources, who have knowledge of the matter but spoke on condition of anonymity, said no agreement had been reached but talks between South Sudan and Israel were ongoing.

The plan, if carried further, would envisage people moving from an enclave shattered by almost two years of war with Israel to a nation [South Sudan] in the heart of Africa riven by years of political and ethnically-driven violence.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office and Israel's foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the information from the three sources.

A spokesperson for the U.S. State Department said, "we do not speak to private diplomatic conversations," when asked about the plan and if the United States supported the idea.

Netanyahu said this month he intends to extend military control in Gaza, and this week repeated suggestions that Palestinians should leave the territory voluntarily.

Arab and world leaders have rejected the idea of moving Gaza's population to any country. Palestinians say that would be like another "Nakba" (catastrophe) when hundreds of thousands fled or were forced out during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

The three sources said the prospect of resettling Palestinians in South Sudan was raised during meetings between Israeli officials and South Sudanese Foreign Minister Monday Semaya Kumba when he visited the country last month.

Their account appeared to contradict South Sudan's foreign ministry which on Wednesday dismissed earlier reports on the plan as "baseless".

The ministry was not immediately available

Netanyahu, who met Kumba last month, has said Israel is in touch with a few countries to find a destination for Palestinians who want to leave Gaza. He has consistently declined to provide further details.

Source: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-talks-resettle-gaza-palestinians-south-sudan-sources-say-2025-08-15/>

to respond to the sources' assertions on Friday.

News of the discussions was first reported by the Associated Press on Tuesday, citing six people with knowledge of the matter.

Wasel Abu Youssef, a member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, said the Palestinian leadership and people "reject any plan or idea to displace any of our people to South Sudan or to any other place".

His statement echoed a statement from the office of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on Thursday. Hamas, which is fighting Israel in Gaza, did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Sharren Haskel, who visited the South Sudanese capital Juba this week, told reporters that those discussions had not focussed on relocation.

"This is not what the discussions were about," she said when asked if any such plan had been discussed.

"The discussions were about foreign policy, about multilateral organisations, about the humanitarian crisis, the real humanitarian crisis happening in South Sudan, and about the war," she said, referring to her talks with Juba officials.

## SOUTH SUDAN SAYS NO TALKS WITH ISRAEL TO RESETTLE PALESTINIANS FROM GAZA

Palestinians, displaced by the Israeli offensive, shelter in a tent camp on a beach amid summer heat in Gaza City, August 12, 2025. REUTERS/Mahmoud Issa/File Photo

NAIROBI, Aug 13 Reuters - South Sudan is not in talks with Israel to resettle Palestinians from war-torn Gaza, South Sudan's foreign ministry said on Wednesday.

On Tuesday, the Associated Press, citing six people with knowledge of the matter, reported that Israel was holding discussions with Juba to resettle Palestinians from Gaza in the East African nation.

"These claims are baseless and do not reflect the official position or policy of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan," South Sudan's foreign affairs ministry said in a statement.

Israel's military has pounded Gaza City in recent days prior to its planned takeover of the shattered enclave which is home to more than 2 million Palestinians.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on [Wednesday reiterated](#) a view - also enthusiastically floated by U.S. President Donald Trump - that Palestinians should simply leave Gaza.

Since achieving independence from Sudan in 2011, South Sudan has spent nearly half its life at war and is currently in the grip of a political crisis, after President Salva Kiir's government ordered the arrest of Vice President Riek Machar in March.

Source: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/south-sudan-says-no-talks-with-israel-resettle-palestinians-gaza-2025-08-13/>

Many world leaders are horrified at the idea of displacing the Gaza population, which Palestinians say would be like another "Nakba" (catastrophe) when hundreds of thousands fled or were forced out during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

In March, Somalia and its breakaway region of Somaliland also denied receiving any proposal from the United States or Israel to resettle Palestinians from Gaza, with Mogadishu saying it categorically rejected any such move.

South Sudan's Foreign Minister Monday Semaya Kumba visited Israel last month and met with Netanyahu, according to the foreign ministry in Juba.

Last month South Sudan's government confirmed that eight migrants deported to the African nation by the Trump administration were currently in the care of the authorities in Juba after they lost a legal battle to halt their transfer.

## UGANDA

### TEMBO STEELS JOINTS IAU TO SPONSOR 50 UGANDA CHILDREN FOR FREE HEART SURGERIES IN INDIA

**EAST AFRICA'S LEADING STEEL MANUFACTURING COMPANY, TEMBO STEELS UGANDA LIMITED REMAINS AT THE FOREFRONT OF NOT ONLY RESHAPING THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, BUT ALSO EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES.**

AUGUST 7<sup>TH</sup> 2025

As you read this, Tembo Steels, the most diversified, integrated company in Africa has partnered with the Indian Association of Uganda to sponsor 50 Ugandan children with life-threatening heart conditions to be taken to India to undergo free surgeries.

The initiative, also funded by the Heart Healthy Foundation, the Rotary Club of Ssesse Islands, and Chennai Thiruvannamiyur, will see the children treated at Namar Health Hospital in Chennai.

At the flag off event where Tembo Steels was represented by Mr Manish Kalla, the company's general manager, officials said surgeries will cover a wide range of cardiac interventions, including bypass procedures and abdominal valve replacements adding that this year's group as the largest batch since the program began in 2008.

"At Tembo Steels, we believe true success is measured by the lives we touch and the futures we help shape. This is more than a medical mission; it's a testament to the power of partnership and compassion. Together, we are giving these children not just treatment, but the opportunity to dream, grow, and thrive", said officials from Tembo.

Many of the children suffer from congenital heart defects, which, if left untreated, drastically reduce life expectancy.

At Tembo Uganda Limited, they believe that creating a strong business and building a better world are essential ingredients for their long-term success. Therefore, in addition to providing Steels products to the customers and in line with their social mission, Tembo Uganda Ltd contributes to improving the quality of life of the people in communities in Uganda.

Through their Corporate Social Investment (CSI) program, Tembo focuses on promoting Health, Education and the Environment. Some of the projects they have undertaken in the recent past include: Donations, participating in charity marathons, staging medical camps among others.

Through their targeted initiatives, Tembo endeavors to create a meaningful, positive and lasting impact, fostering a better future for individuals, businesses, and the environment alike.

Mehta Paresh, acting chairman of the Indian Association Uganda, said the surgeries, many of which are costly and out of reach

for most Ugandan families, are part of their commitment to giving back to society.

"We have so many underprivileged children who need operations. This year alone, we are aiming to do 100 surgeries," Paresh said during a press briefing in Kampala.

Kumar Sasi Nair, the Association's secretary, said over 200 heart surgeries have already been completed under the programme, with 30 carried out since January.

"Today we are sending the first batch of 12 children. This is the biggest number we have ever sent at once," he said.

Ronald Kusiima, whose three-year-old son is among the first group, recounted how doctors discovered the boy had a hole in his heart.

The children's departure comes as pressure mounts on the health sector to address Uganda's limited cardiac care capacity. Advocates say localising such services would save lives and significantly reduce the burden on struggling families

Source: [Tembo Steels Joins IAU to Sponsor 50 Ugandan children for free heart surgeries in India – The Voice Uganda](#)

"We found out when he was six months old. He was constantly ill. I couldn't afford the surgery, so I reached out for help. We're grateful he was selected," he said.

Ritah Namyalo of the Heart Healthy Foundation said the Uganda Heart Institute estimates that 16,000 children are born with congenital heart disease annually in the country. Of these, half require surgical intervention.

"Sadly, most don't survive beyond the age of five if not treated. It's unfortunate that we have only one heart theatre in the entire country catering to both children and adults," Namyalo said.

She called on the Ugandan government to invest in more specialised facilities to reduce dependence on foreign care and expand local access.

## FAMILIES BUILT ON LOVE: BISHOP WANOK OPENS CCR WOMEN'S CONFERENCE IN LIRA

AUGUST 24<sup>TH</sup> 2025

"At the CCR Women's Conference in Lira Diocese, Bishop Sanctus Lino Wanok inspired hundreds of women with a powerful message: families rooted in God's love are the foundation of faith, unity, and enduring joy."

By Flavia Oyuu, Communications Office, Lira Diocese

The Bishop of Lira Diocese, Rt. Rev. Sanctus Lino Wanok, has urged families to build their lives on truth, loyalty, and enduring love, drawing inspiration from the biblical story of Ruth.

Preaching at the opening Mass of the **Catholic**

**Charismatic Renewal (CCR) Women's Conference**, hosted at Asili Girls Vocational Secondary School in Amuca, Bishop Wanok reflected on this year's theme: "*In Christ we are a new creation*" (2 Corinthians 5:17). The four-day gathering, running from August 21–25, has drawn women from across the diocese in a celebration of faith, unity, and renewal.

## THE MESSAGE OF RUTH: LOVE BEYOND BOUNDARIES

In his homily, Bishop Wanok pointed to Ruth's famous words to Naomi—"Where you go I will go, your people shall be my people, and your God shall be my God"—as a powerful reminder of love that transcends blood, culture, or background.

"Ruth teaches us that true love is faithful, sacrificial, and rooted in God," he said. "Marriage and family are not simply about two individuals. They are a covenant journey of faith, where love remains steadfast even through trials and hardships."

He noted that, just like Ruth left her homeland to embrace Naomi's people, women today often leave their families to begin new lives with their husbands. This calling, he said, should be lived out with courage and anchored in God's love so that it can endure every storm.

## WOMEN AS PILLARS OF FAITH

Turning to the women gathered, Bishop Wanok praised their vital role in sustaining homes, communities, and the Church through prayer, sacrifice, and forgiveness.

"Women carry the burden of unity in their homes," he said. "They are often the first to forgive, the first to pray, and the first to hold the family together. You are the pillars of faith in our community."

He encouraged couples present at the conference to bear witness to faithful love by ensuring equality, dialogue, and forgiveness in their homes, reminding them that families are "the first and most important Synodal Church," where communion and mission begin.

## A CALL TO BUILD FAMILIES AS SCHOOLS OF LOVE

In his opening address, Bishop Wanok reminded participants that family unity is not only a private matter but also a **social, cultural, and even political treasure**.

"Love cannot remain hidden in the heart—it must reach out," he said. "From the home, it grows into schools, workplaces, and society until it builds a nation. Families rooted in God's love become the foundation of a just and peaceful community."

Prayer and Scripture at the heart of the home, dialogue and forgiveness, as a way to resolve conflicts peacefully, example and solidarity, where parents model love, honesty, and faith for their children, while families support each other in times of sickness, poverty, or conflict.

He emphasized three practical pillars for strengthening family life:

"The family," he concluded, "is a treasure. When it is built on love, it becomes the dwelling place of the Holy Spirit."

## A SPIRIT-FILLED GATHERING

The conference, open to all faithful at a facilitation fee of just 10,000 shillings, is designed to be a spiritually enriching and transformational encounter. Guest speakers include **Silvie and Gaetana** from the *House of the Open Door Community* in the United Kingdom, alongside facilitators such as Rev. Fr. Morris Otyang, the diocesan CCR Spiritual Director, and other facilitators from Emmaus Center Katikamu.

With liturgies, praise, and teachings filling the program, this gathering promises to leave the women of Lira renewed in spirit, strengthened in their vocation, and ready to carry the

Bishop's message of faithful love back into their families and communities.

Source: [Families Built on Love: Bishop Wanok Opens CCR Women's Conference in Lira - Uganda Catholic Television](#)

## FLOODS WREAK HAVOC IN KATAKWI DISTRICT, DESTROYING CROPS AND HOMES

AUGUST 25<sup>TH</sup> 2025

Katakwi District is reeling from the effects of persistent heavy rains that have pounded the region for nearly two weeks, leaving a trail of destruction across several sub-counties.

The flooding has submerged gardens, demolished homes, and cut off vital roads, putting residents at risk of hunger and disease.

"We have nowhere else to go. I lost household property and my television worth 300,000 shillings when the wall collapsed," Omulen narrated, visibly distraught.

Our correspondent, who visited parts of Goshen, Palam, and Dokomer villages in Katakwi Town Council and Palam Sub-county, found devastating scenes of collapsed houses, waterlogged farmland, and stranded families.

Another resident, Julius Audo, revealed that the damp environment has worsened health risks for his pregnant wife, Irene Atino.

Local administrators confirmed that close to 100 crop gardens have been destroyed, alongside more than 30 houses that could no longer withstand the surging water.

"We keep going back to the clinic because of complications from the cold and the damp floors. This situation is unbearable," Audo lamented.

According to James Stephen Ilakut, the LC I Defense Secretary for Dokomer Cell, more than 20 gardens have been inundated and at least 10 buildings destroyed.

The floods have also triggered severe food insecurity.

"We are overwhelmed by the scale of damage. Families have lost their homes, crops, and sources of income within days," Ilakut told reporters.

Anna Grace Imalingat, a Goshen resident, said her family has been forced to survive on a single meal per day after cassava, groundnut, and potato gardens were submerged and began rotting.

Among the victims is Alex Omulen, a resident of Goshen Central Ward, Katakwi Town Council, whose family of six is now sheltering in a small kitchen after their two main houses caved in.

"We don't know how we shall survive the next few weeks," she said.

Echoing similar fears, Grace Alupo of Goshen Cell warned that residents are on the verge of starvation and facing the risk of waterborne diseases.

"Children are already suffering from cold-related illnesses. We urgently need relief support," Alupo pleaded.

Sam Okello, the acting LC I Chairperson of Goshen Cell and General Secretary of Dokomer Cell, estimated that nearly 100 gardens and about 10 residences have been destroyed.

"This disaster is beyond what we can handle locally. We are appealing to the district disaster committee for urgent food and health support," Okello said.

He also noted that water run-off from the Bindadi sale road, worsened by heavy rains, has intensified the flooding.

District leaders are now moving to assess the full extent of damage and explore relief options.

Geoffrey Omolo, the Katakwi District LCV Chairperson and a member of the district disaster committee, confirmed that several roads, including the Bidandi sale road, have

With the rains expected to continue in the coming weeks, residents fear that the worst may not yet be over. Unless urgent interventions are made, thousands could be left homeless, hungry, and vulnerable to disease.

Source: [Floods Wreak Havoc in Katakwi District, Destroying Crops and Homes - Uganda Catholic Television](#)

been submerged or rendered impassable.

"Some of these roads, about 12 kilometers within the town council, were already earmarked for rehabilitation, but the floods have made the situation worse," Omolo said.

As the damage worsens, residents are appealing for government intervention. Community members are urging the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Disaster Preparedness to provide tapelines, gumboots, and chlorine tablets to help prevent the outbreak of waterborne diseases such as cholera and dysentery.

"The district is doing what it can, but the scale of the destruction requires national-level attention. We need immediate relief in terms of food, shelter, and clean water," a village elder in Palam sub-county emphasized.

Meanwhile, humanitarian organizations have been called upon to step in with emergency relief assistance as Katakwi faces a mounting humanitarian crisis.

# KENYA

## PRISONS SEEK SH4 BILLION TO REPLACE OBSOLETE MACHINES, BOOST INMATE TRAINING.

AUGUST 31<sup>ST</sup> 2025

The State Department for Correctional Services has asked the National Assembly for Sh4 billion to modernise machinery and equipment at Kenya Prisons Enterprises to strengthen rehabilitation programmes while positioning the correctional services as a key revenue earner.

Director of Prisons Farms and Enterprises, Patrick Kariri, said most of the machinery at prison industries and farms was outdated, undermining both productivity and training.

The proposed funding, he said, will replace obsolete equipment with modern technologies, enabling the enterprises to operate competitively in the market.

“The old and obsolete machines will be disposed of and replaced with new ones to enhance production, performance, and efficiency,” Kariri said during an interview with KNA.

He noted that the modernisation will have a dual impact: boosting revenues for the correctional service while equipping inmates with employable skills.

“Inmates will now be able to derive some income from the products and work they do in the enterprises. With proper tools and certified vocational training, they will leave prison with marketable skills, reducing chances of reoffending,” he explained.

Kenya Prisons Enterprises runs workshops and farms across the country, producing a

wide range of goods—from school desks, motor vehicle number plates, hospital beds, and uniforms to processed dairy products, baked goods, and even leather footwear.

However, many of the machines powering these units are relics of the 1970s and 1980s, hampering efficiency in production.

In carpentry, for instance, creaking band saws and manual planers are still used to cut timber into desks and cabinets.

Tailoring workshops rely on foot-powered sewing machines to stitch prison and school uniforms.

With the proposed funding, the obsolete equipment will be replaced with industrial-grade equipment such as CNC wood-cutting machines, digital embroidery units, and modern welding sets—technology that can raise efficiency, cut costs, and produce goods that compete with imports.

The Kenya Prisons Enterprise Fund Regulations 2025, currently under stakeholder review, seek to consolidate the existing Prisons Industries Fund (1987) and Prisons Farms

Fund (1993) into a single entity governed by a board and chief executive officer.

According to Kariri, aligning prison enterprises with modern financial and governance frameworks will help transform them into commercially viable ventures.

This is expected to significantly raise the department's revenue base, which currently relies on small-scale, low-output production due to old machinery.

The reforms also provide for inmates to benefit financially from their labour in structured ways, while officers with relevant expertise will be tapped to support the fund before new staff are recruited.

*Source: [Prisons Seek Sh4 billion to Replace Obsolete Machines, Boost Inmate Training – Kenya News Agency](#)*

Kariri said once the modernisation takes effect, prison workshops and farms will be able to produce goods and services that compete in the open market, while ensuring that rehabilitation remains at the core of the enterprises.

"We are looking at a situation where more inmates can be enrolled in training programmes, acquire certification, and utilise their skills after release. At the same time, the enterprises will generate more revenue for the country," he said.

Public participation forums have already been held in major prisons across the country, with the final draft of the regulations expected to be completed in the coming weeks.

## **KENYA, UGANDA MOVE TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES FACING CROSS-BORDER TRADE.**

The Kenyan and Ugandan governments have embarked on addressing challenges faced by cross-border traders marked by the poor state of infrastructure and inadequate scanners to support the clearing process so as to facilitate seamless trade along the Busia and Malaba One Stop Border Points.

Trade and transportation through the Busia and Malaba border crossings have experienced growth and constant activity at East Africa's cargo and passenger access points, but there has been a constant voice of concern from traders and transporters regarding an increase in delays, long queues, and high operational costs associated with obsolete and inapt systems.

Speaking after inspecting the OSBPs at Malaba and Busia, the Cabinet Secretary for Investments, Trade, and Industries, Lee

Kinyanjui, and his Ugandan counterpart, Gen. Wilson Mbasu, noted that there is a need for urgent intervention to address the issues raised, which have led to traffic snarl-ups leading to huge losses as a result of delays that are occasioned by clearing processes.

"We cannot keep letting inefficiencies at our main points of entry hinder operations because every delay results in financial loss for our people. We want to make sure that traders move their goods quickly and predictably," stated CS Kinyanjui.

The two ministers noted that in order to facilitate trade, regional integration, and people-to-people ties, the Government of Kenya and Uganda must upgrade the Suam Point of Entry/Exit to a modern One-Stop Border Post (OSBP) to enable border management officers from both countries to share space for quicker clearance of human and vehicle traffic.

“When delays persist, the very essence of regional integration is undermined. Uganda and Kenya must act fast to keep trade flowing and protect the livelihoods of our traders,” remarked Gen. Mbasu.

The business community, along with regional transport operators, is increasing its lobbying efforts for the delay to be lifted, which has been affecting trade competitiveness. In the past, truck drivers used to wait for days to get their consignments cleared, and as a result, perishable goods spoiled, and operational costs shot up.

Source: [Kenya, Uganda Move to Address Challenges Facing Cross-Border Trade – Kenya News Agency](#)

Additionally, East African Community integration goals have been constantly undermined, as these issues have not only stalled the flow of goods, but their impact is slowly and steadily becoming worse.

The completion of Suam OSBP (One Stop Border Post) will provide traders with an alternative clearance point, which will reduce procedures and congestion at Malaba and Busia.

The Suam One Stop Border Post will further streamline the security processes and will quicken the movement of manufactured goods, farm products, and other vital goods between the two bordering countries.

This points to the fact that the two countries are under one goal of fighting the trade barriers and of working towards the development of the integrated economy of the region.

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P.O. BOX 619, Hai Jebrona, Adjacent to Martyrs School,  
Opposite Simba Playground, Juba, South Sudan.  
Tel: +211 (0) 920 310 415 | +211 (0) 915 652 847  
<https://cspss.org.ss>