

THE ILEMI TRIANGLE

A TINDERBOX IN THE WAITING?

— AMOS LOKAII



ABOUT THIS SERIES

This collection of policy briefs explores national security priorities in the Transitional Period. Published jointly by the Security Studies Network (SSN) and the Center for Strategic and Policy Studies (CSPS), the policy briefs offer succinct and actionable recommendations for South Sudanese policymakers.

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SUMMARY

- Kenya's *de facto* control of the Ilemi Triangle raises the specter of escalation between communities at the border and more broadly, between Kenya and South Sudan. Such escalation will have an overall negative impact on South Sudan's economy.
- Policymakers should treat the dispute in the Ilemi Triangle as a national security concern by rethinking current strategies of engagement with Kenya, with a view of making them effective to hasten the resolution of the dispute.

THE DANGER OF LAXITY ON THE ILEMI TRIANGLE

The South Sudan-Kenya border in the Ilemi Triangle has witnessed a series of fatal skirmishes as far back as 2009. In one bloody incident in 2009, angry Toposa youth allegedly attacked a Kenyan military post in Nadapal, leaving sixteen Kenyan soldiers and one Toposa youth dead.¹ The attack came after the signing of an agreement between the then Government of Southern Sudan and Kenya, that allowed Kenya to establish a temporary border control post adjacent to an existing Southern Sudan border post at Nadapal.² This move angered the Toposa youth, who thought their land was being taken over by the Kenyan government.

Over the years, such confrontations have continued along the common border with Kenya, amid news reports indicating Kenya is extending its presence in the Ilemi Triangle by establishing military and police posts deep inside the disputed border.³ Borders that are not demarcated encourage occupation by the armed forces of neighboring countries. These opportunistic moves, often fueled by nationalistic fervor, elevate the risk of armed confrontation between countries. The violence in the Ilemi Triangle indicates that the area is a tinderbox that can implode in conflict at any time. Any conflict in the area could likely affect the bilateral relationship between Kenya and South Sudan.

Currently, the whole of the Ilemi Triangle is under *de facto* and effective Kenyan control, a feat which constitutes a significant challenge to South Sudan's claims over the area. Years of internal strife in South Sudan have prevented the country's politicians from paying full attention to the Ilemi Triangle. But the current peace agreement opens the path for the country's politicians to put their house in order and to begin the process of focusing on national challenges regardless of their political stripes. The extension of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) creates an opportunity to rethink national security priorities by exerting renewed effort on resolving disputes in contested border areas like the Ilemi Triangle, Abyei, Kafia Kingi, Huftrat Nihias, and Mile 14.

¹ Reuters Staff, "Tribesmen kill 16 Kenyan Soldiers: South Sudan Army," Reuters, October 17, 2009, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-kenya-attack-idUSTRE59G0NU20091017>

The Kenya military denied the allegation, but local Toposa contacts insist the incident happened.

² See, "Minutes of a Joint Ministerial Meeting on the Management of the Common Border Between the Government of Kenya and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) Held on 13 August 2009 at Harambee House, Nairobi, Kenya," 1.

³ Daily Nation, "Two Soldiers Killed at Kenya-Sudan Border," Daily Nation, February 14, 2010, <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/two-soldiers-killed-at-kenya-sudan-border-624028>

Policymakers should adopt a long-term and multifaceted strategy to addressing the dispute in the Ilemi Triangle to maximize outcomes in favor of South Sudan. Any strategy to address the issue must account for the fact that South Sudan is a landlocked country that relies heavily on imported goods that transit through Kenya. Any escalation of tensions in the Ilemi Triangle, may impede the flow of goods from the port of Mombasa and affect South Sudan’s economy negatively. Strategies for resolving the dispute must therefore be thoughtful, tactful, and diplomatic.

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As a starting point, policymakers should review current policy frameworks on border issues to revive their effectiveness. Although a border committee was established some years ago, its effectiveness has been stymied by lack of funds, and as a result, most of the committee’s tasks remain pending.⁴ In addition, the absence of an officially documented foreign policy, hinders the design of a coherent evidence-based strategy to address the country’s claim to the Ilemi Triangle.⁵ In the face of Kenya’s bold presence in the Triangle, South Sudan risks losing out altogether if it does not exert a reenergized effort on the matter.

This brief describes the dangers of not delimiting and demarcating the said border and the need to swiftly address the matter once and for all for sustainable peace and stability in the Ilemi Triangle as well as for South Sudan as a whole. Policymakers should immediately, through the relevant government departments, adopt short- and long-term measures to address the dispute in the Ilemi Triangle, which now constitutes a national security priority deserving full attention.

⁴ Author’s personal conversation with one of the committee members in November 2021.

⁵ A foreign policy draws inputs from a comprehensive national security policy, which South Sudan currently does not have. A draft foreign policy was unveiled in 2014, but there is no publicly available information to determine if at all it was used to guide policy or even if it is still in use. See, *Sudan Tribune*, “South Sudan Launches its Draft Foreign Policy,” October 3, 2014, <https://sudantribune.com/article66363/>

A COMPLEX HISTORY

South Sudan's independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011, meant it became successor to all institutions, assets, and boundaries of the former Southern Sudan region of Sudan.

International law defines the qualities of a state as constituting the presence of an authority (government), a permanent population, a defined territory and capacity to conduct international relations.⁶ South Sudan meets these criteria, but its territorial integrity is challenged in contested areas along the common border with neighboring countries, notably, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, and the Central African Republic.

Since independence in 2011, insufficient progress has been made as far as the demarcation of international boundaries is concerned despite the establishment of committees tasked with handling border issues between South Sudan and Sudan and South Sudan and Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.⁷ Nearly all the disputed international borders of South of Sudan remain undemarcated and undelimited, leaving border communities in a constant state of anxiety over the encroachment of their lands by neighboring countries.

With specific reference to the Ilemi Triangle, it is worth noting that prior to 1926, before the transfer of the Rudolf Province of Uganda to Kenya by British colonial authorities, Kenya did not have a border with Sudan.⁸ However, the history of demarcating the border in the Ilemi Triangle is long and complex. Colonial exigencies, lack of resources and neglect in the post-independence era, have contributed to the challenges of demarcating the boundary in the Triangle. In 1914, colonial authorities first drew a line from Nimule to Lake Rudolph (currently Lake Turkana in Kenya) to mark the boundary between Sudan and Kenya.⁹ As with most colonial borders, this was an arbitrary line that did not account for the fact that the Turkana, for example, often crossed into Sudanese territory to graze their animals. The drawers of the line did concede, however, that the "exact limits [of the border] remain for further consideration when the limits of the Turkana and Dabosa [Toposa] grazing grounds are more accurately known." Acknowledging the arbitrariness of their act, they said that "owing to the inter-mixture of the various tribes, it is impossible to determine a hard and fast tribal boundary and suggest that when the territory on either side of the frontier comes to be closely administered, any small alterations which will facilitate administration can be effected."¹⁰

Compounding this challenge, was the fact that the Sudanese government had not yet established control on the Toposa in the area. This meant that Turkana herders were often

6 "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States," (Montevideo: December 26, 1934) <https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.xml>

7 There are two border Committees established by the President of the Republic of South Sudan. One is handles South Sudan and Sudan border matters and the other one is responsible for South Sudan and Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic border issues. The June 2019 MOU between Kenya and South Sudan has created further subcommittees like joint technical committee, joint demarcation committee and joint community committee under its institutional framework on delimitation and demarcation of the border.

8 Douglas H. Johnson, "Southern Sudan Boundaries: Background Paper," September 2007, 46, <https://dl.tufts.edu/pdfviewer/0p096k50c/pr76fg78s>

9 Although the British ruled Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda, each territory had its separate colonial government.

10 Ibid.

left vulnerable to attacks by their Toposa counterparts, so much that both the Uganda and Kenya governments at one time asked the Sudan to either take control of the area or relinquish control. Sudan finally succeeded in establishing a post in Kapoeta in 1927/28. In 1927, a massive Toposa cattle raid on the Turkana convinced the Kenya colonial administration to set up a post at Lokitaung in 1928. Later, this presence was extended northwards into the Ilemi Triangle, with the tacit support of the Sudan government, which gave its consent and even offered financial compensation to the Kenya government.¹¹ From the late 1920s up to 1950, many arbitrary lines, numbering six, have been drawn in the Ilemi Triangle by colonial authorities, to protect Kenyan and Turkana interests. The last of the lines was the Sudan Patrol Line, drawn in 1950 to prevent the Kenya government from moving further north into the Triangle.¹²

In all, these lines were provisional in nature. For example, in 1947, the so-called Blue Line, which extended Kenyan presence northwards, was drawn, and accepted by both the Sudanese and Kenyan colonial governments as “a very satisfactory administrative boundary between the Turkana and the Tapotha (sic) and Nyangatom.”¹³ As the British prepared to pull out of Sudan in 1953, the Kenyan government, in a letter to the Colonial Civil Secretary in Khartoum, acknowledged the temporariness of Kenyan administration in the Triangle. The letter noted that for “many years,” the Kenyan government had maintained a costly police presence in money and manpower, “beyond the de facto boundary as far North as Kisbish Wells,” adding that by assuming police functions “beyond our frontiers,” the move shielded the Turkana from raids by Ethiopian tribesmen.¹⁴

KENYA’S BOLD MOVES IN THE TRIANGLE

The Kenyan government then formally requested the outgoing British colonial government to require the incoming Sudanese government to allow the arrangements which enabled the Kenyan government to administer the area up to the Blue Line or assume full control of the area itself. But the departing British officials did not agree, arguing that the issue is subject to negotiation between the Kenyan government and the new Sudanese administration.¹⁵

Before 1978, Kenyan maps showed the boundary in the Ilemi Triangle in dotted lines, often accompanied by the term “provisional/administrative boundary.” But after 1978, a noticeable absence of the dotted line in Kenyan maps was recorded. Instead, the maps showed the Ilemi Triangle in a continuous solid line, meaning its “provisional” circumstance no longer existed. More over, the maps showed an extended triangular line marking the border further north of the previously straight dotted line separating both countries. Subsequently, rumors circulated that the Sudanese government had ceded the area to Kenya after it signed a secret pact with former President Daniel Moi in return for the latter to stop military aid to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Other rumors alleged that the SPLA entered a pact with Moi, who agreed to support the rebel movement in exchange for control over the area.¹⁶

11 Eliza Snel and Lotje de Vries, “The Ilemi Triangle: Understanding a Pastoralist Border,” *Pax for Peace*, February 2022, 11, <https://paxforpeace.nl/what-we-do/publications/the-ilemi-triangle>

12 Ibid, 10-14.

13 Johnson, “Southern Sudan Boundaries,” 47.

14 Ibid, 47.

15 Ibid, 48.

16 Nene Mburu, “Delimitation of the Elastic Ilemi Triangle: Pastoral Conflicts and Official Indifference in the Horn of Africa,” *Africa Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 6, Issue 4 (Spring 2003): 31.

Nevertheless, recent testimony revealed during Kenya's search for a new chief justice in April 2021, debunked the rumors cited above and unearthed a deliberate and strategic ploy by Kenyan officials to occupy the area in 1985. Fred Ngatia, one of the contestants for the position, told a panel that Kenya's attorney general, nominated him to examine the issue of the contested boundary between Sudan and Kenya, with the aim of using his findings to claim sovereignty in the Ilemi Triangle. Subsequently, he was sponsored to conduct original research into the matter as part of his graduate studies in London in 1984. In sum, Ngatia argued that in a disputed boundary, the principles of international law favor the state that establishes *de facto* presence in the contested area. "Then in 1985-86, we had an extended boundary that went toward Sudan," he told the panel, adding that in graphic terms, the amount of land Kenya attained as a result was 9,680,000 km.¹⁷

SHORTCOMINGS IN PAST STRATEGIES

The Ilemi Triangle, which is a triangular strip of land that lies between South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda is one of the most contested boundaries of South Sudan. Most scholars who have studied the area, agree that only Ethiopia does not lay claim to it; Addis Ababa's interest is relegated only to the pursuit of bandits on the border with Kenya.¹⁸

The border area that is highly contested is Eastern Ilemi.¹⁹ By virtue of being a successor state after her independence from Sudan, South Sudan has a legitimate claim over the Ilemi Triangle. Under article 1(2) of the Transitional constitution 2011, South Sudan's territory is defined as all land and airspace that comprised the three former provinces of Bar el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile in their boundaries as they stood on January 1, 1956, including the Abyei Area, the territory of nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms.²⁰

The Ilemi Triangle is rich in pasture and water for pastoralist communities in South Sudan and Kenya. Whereas the area was initially considered unproductive territory by the government of the Sudan, the pastoralists who live and transhumance in the area consider it as an economic lifeline. This is because they graze their livestock in the area during the dry season throughout the year

The violent incident at the border in 2009, reflects the fears of the Toposa community about the grabbing of this vital lifeline from them. In the wake of the violence, the movement of people and goods between the two countries along the Nadapal-Lokichogio road was halted for some time. Although there are no studies to quantify the economic consequences of this closure, it underscores the fact that any escalation in the Ilemi Triangle has the potential to do damage to South Sudan's economy and to the economy of the communities that live in the area.

17 KTN News Kenya, "Senior Counsel Fred Ngatia on Why he Should Become the Next Chief Justice of Kenya," *YouTube*, April 20, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJ00r-Gqi6Q>

18 Michael Lopuke, "The Ilemi Triangle: The Shadows of the Four Lines on the Grass," August 28, 2019, <https://www.elfss.org/design-post/>; Fred Ngatia, "The Legal Difficulty of Delimiting the Kenya-Sudan Boundary," (Masters diss., University of London, 1984), 1-88; and Muaz Ahmed M. Tungo, "The Ilemi Triangle: Sudan-Kenya Disputed International Boundary," (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 2008), 40-41.

19 Ibid, 40-41.

20 The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, Part 1, Article 1(1)(2)(3), 2011, 5, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2011.pdf

This is a serious national security issue as it threatens the peaceful and cordial relationship between South Sudan and Kenya. The continued reluctance to delimit and demarcate the Ilemi Triangle has forced the inhabitants of the area to take it upon themselves to protect what each perceives to be its traditional land. The Ilemi Triangle question should therefore be treated as a national security priority that requires urgent resolution. Now with the discovery of oil in Turkana land, interest in this neglected region has intensified and is likely to increase the possibility of open interstate conflict.²¹

Although the 2009 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Kenya and Southern Sudan (now South Sudan) does not confirm Nadapal to be the international boundary between Kenya and Sudan (now South Sudan), Kenya has taken both legal and administrative actions that negate this provision. Nadapal, the supposedly “temporary” security checkpoint is now considered a port of entry by Kenya’s State Department of Immigration with a well-established army barracks and administration police post, including immigration offices.²²

Ten years later in 2019, Kenya and South Sudan signed another MoU on delimiting and demarcating the common border.²³ The MoU calls for the formation of joint committees of South Sudanese and Kenyan officials, at both the ministerial and technical levels, to discuss issues on the Ilemi Triangle. Each country can initiate discussions and decide the venue for holding the talks. However, the country in which the meetings are held bears the cost of hosting. The MoU itself is a roadmap that spells out the process of resolving the Ilemi Triangle dispute. Its key weakness, however, is that it does not set a specific timeline for resolving the dispute.

Nearly four years down the line, there is no visible effort in South Sudan to move the ball on the Ilemi Triangle. In the meantime, it appears Kenya is determined to take full control and ownership of the disputed area by cementing its *de facto* presence. If nothing is done about it as soon as practically possible, the area will eventually be lost and continue to be a source of conflict between Kenya and South Sudan, to the detriment of South Sudan’s national security and political stability.

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The government of South Sudan has established a border committee which policymakers are contemplating to convert into a Border Commission. This is yet to happen. The ideal step should have been to draft a Border Commission Bill to create an institutionalized framework toward this objective as opposed to *ad hoc* committees. The Border Committee’s work is hindered by lack of finances.²⁴ The establishment of a Border Committee is a crucial step, but it must be supported by concrete actions meant to achieve the objective of delimiting and demarcating the international boundary.

21 Snel and de Vries, “The Ilemi Triangle,” 6.

22 See the Fourth Schedule to the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Rules 2012. <http://www.kenyaembassyireland.net/wp-content/uploads/Kenya-Citizenship-Regulations-2012.pdf>

23 Memorandum of Understanding between Kenya and South Sudan on the Boundary Delimitation and Demarcation, (June 2019), Article III (1) (2) (3). The MOU is reproduced as an annex in Snel and de Vries’ paper cited in this brief on pages 47-50.

24 One of the members of the committee confided in the author that their greatest challenge is lack of funds.

Since independence, policymakers in South Sudan have failed to craft a coherent foreign policy strategy, that would among other things, address the myriad border problems facing the country. In relation to Kenya, South Sudan's *ad hoc* foreign policy stance is one that encourages friendly neighborliness and diplomacy except in times of aggression and self-defense.²⁵ This is important because Kenya is a country which has strong ties with South Sudan, dating back to the liberation era. However, South Sudanese officials should be aware that a foreign policy strategy premised on the concept of friendly neighborliness can be exploited by a more powerful and predatory neighboring state. Given Kenya's strategic importance to South Sudan's economy, tact and diplomacy are essential ingredients to sustaining amicable relations. Nevertheless, the lack of a foreign policy strategy means that measures undertaken on the Ilemi Triangle can be ambiguous or lacking coherence and sustained attention by policymakers. It also means mechanisms to resolve the matter may suffer from funding shortfalls, lack of political will and buy-in from local stakeholder communities along the border.

CONCLUSION

Due to the lack of delimitation and demarcation of the border, the specter of conflicts is heightened considerably in the Ilemi Triangle. Bloody skirmishes pitting the Toposa with the Turkana, and sometimes with the Kenyan security forces, continue to occur in the area. The 2009 Nadapal incident is a case in point. With Kenya in effective control of the whole Triangle, the Toposa community has been deprived of its traditional land and grazing area, which now benefits the Turkana across the new frontier.

Since the discovery of oil in Turkana land, the previous assumption that the Ilemi Triangle is an unproductive strip is rendered obsolete. By implication, this also means that potential for conflict has increased because of the presence of oil. This requires that South Sudanese policymakers should rethink previous strategies on the Triangle with a view of embracing a multifaceted approach to resolve the border dispute.

Finally, despite Kenya's *de facto* control along the common border in the Ilemi Triangle, the fact remains that the area is still disputed. South Sudan must take all the requisite diplomatic measures to ensure that her claim to the Ilemi Triangle is not extinguished by Kenya's derivative title to the area.

²⁵ Dhanojak Obongo, "The South Sudan Foreign Policy," *Sudan Tribune*, April 19, 2013, <https://sudantribune.com/article46762/>

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Ilemi Triangle border dispute is so old and complicated that a single rushed action could be disastrous in the long run. Continued delay and indifference on the matter by South Sudan does not engender confidence in the government. Rather, it will breed resentment by the communities affected directly along the border. Evidentially, the Ilemi Triangle is a national security issue and South Sudan's government, through its various institutions and departments, should accord the matter utmost attention going forward.

ENSURE A PREDICTABLE FUNDING MECHANISM FOR THE BORDER COMMITTEE

The National Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning should avail the much-needed funds to the Border Committee so that the committee can commence and finalize tasks outlined in the June 2019 MoU on Border Delimitation and Demarcation between Kenya and South Sudan. These tasks include community sensitization, delimitation, and demarcation of the border, including arbitration, and mediation or litigation on border issues when necessary. Resourcing the committee with sufficient funds should be treated as a matter of urgency since the risk of conflict has been elevated with the recent discovery of oil in Turkana land, which further heightens the possibility of the loss of the entire area to Kenya.

INTRODUCE A BORDER COMMISSION BILL IN THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE

Lack of funds is not the only challenge that is obstructing progress on resolving the Ilemi Triangle dispute. The absence of a sustainable institutional framework to guide planning, research and the actual implementation of border resolutions and strategies is a major concern. There is a need for the Ministry of Justice to formulate a bill on the establishment of a Border Commission as a national institution that will handle all border issues in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The draft bill should also provide for the establishment of the Border Guards Division of the South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF) to be recruited, trained, and deployed in all border entry points.²⁶ Although the South Sudan Police is tasked with managing border entry points, it is ill-suited for this purpose: South Sudan's neighbors have not shied from using their militaries to encroach on South Sudanese territory. Uganda and Kenya, for example, maintain a military presence and barracks at the Elegu-Nimule and Nadapal entry points, respectively.²⁷ The division shall be optimized for border protection and

²⁶ Other countries with border guards include Egypt, Finland, India, Australia, Germany and among others. The Egyptian one is under the Ministry of Defense. South Sudan could adopt a similar method.

²⁷ The Ugandan and Sudanese armies have made repeated incursions into South Sudanese territory to date.

patrol to deter forceful encroachment into South Sudanese territory. Some of the specific tasks of the Border Guard Division could be:

- a. Controlling and guarding borders.
- b. Controlling the transportation of weapons, ammunition, military equipment, and hardware over the national border.
- c. Investigate cases related to offenses along the national border.
- d. Provide systematic and permanent observation of the national border space, from land, river, lake, or air by visual, electronic or other modern means of surveillance and protection to detect, alert and prevent possible violations in the international limit; and
- e. Verification and reporting on the maintenance and conservation of border beacons or markers.

The Border Guards should be under the Ministry of Defense and Veteran Affairs and the division should be a military rather than a law enforcement agency. The Ministry should consider the establishment of a Border Guards Division as one of the key reforms to be embraced to enable the ministry, through the SSPDF, to meet the obligations of securing the territorial integrity of South Sudan.

A NEW REENERGIZED DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT WITH KENYA

Since there is already an engagement track with Kenya on border delimitation and demarcation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should design a new and reenergized diplomatic approach to dissuade Kenya from past or planned unilateral encroachment into the contested territory. Steps along this line should encourage Kenya to halt any economic or developmental activities within the Ilemi Triangle and at “Nadapal security checkpoint,” where its army, police and immigration officers are stationed. Further, the ministry should advise Kenya to desist from depicting contested border areas within the Ilemi Triangle as the official international boundary between both countries in her maps.

FOSTER PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AMONG BORDER COMMUNITIES

To enhance a harmonious and peaceful relationship between the Toposa and Turkana, the Ministry of Peace Building in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs needs to come up with programs aimed at fostering peaceful coexistence between the two border communities.

CONSOLIDATE PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN

Because the Ilemi Triangle is a national security issue, it is incumbent upon the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity to consolidate peace to enable sustained focus on critical sovereignty and security issues, among them the delimitation and demarcation of the South-Sudan Kenya border. Without peace and stability, the government's efforts in securing and protecting the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity would be frustrated outrightly.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Amos Lokaii is a South Sudanese youth from Eastern Equatoria State. He is a lawyer by profession and an advocate of the High court of Kenya, having been admitted to the bar in the same country in June 2018. Amos holds a Bachelor of Laws degree from Kabarak University and a Postgraduate Diploma in Legal practice from The Kenya School of Law in Nairobi, Kenya. His research interests include international boundaries, international law, oil and gas law and constitutional law.

Amos has worked in Kenya as a trainee advocate at AF Gross Advocate in 2016. Thereafter, he returned to South Sudan and briefly worked with the defunct Kapoeta State Government for nearly a year. He has worked for humanitarian organizations from August 2017 until February 2022. The humanitarian organizations he has worked for include American Refugee Committee (now ALIGHT), South Sudan Red Cross Society, among others.

Amos is currently running a sole consultancy on protection, capacity building, legal compliance, legal and legislative drafting, and development of policy documents. As a young leader, Amos believes in transformative leadership. He is a moderate liberal and a champion for change and development. He is a member of Advocates Mentorship Centre (Kenya) and Equatoria Leadership Forum, a forum that seeks to offer a transformative and research-based approach in addressing pertinent leadership issues affecting people in the Greater Equatoria region.

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